今天我们来聊一个挺有意思的离婚案，也是英国法院新鲜出炉的新案例：Helliwell v Entwistle（2025）。
这件事告诉我们一个道理：哪怕是短暂、且没有孩子的婚姻，只要涉及到钱，尤其是婚前协议，一点“隐瞒”都可能影响最后的结果。
故事背景
Helliwell和Entwistle这对夫妇于2016年相识，并在2019年结婚。两人当时都是40岁出头的样子，婚后没孩子，婚姻持续了大概三年。
据了解，俩人的财富悬殊有些大。女方家里非常有钱，个人名下资产介于6000万至7000万英镑之间，年收入也很不错——约为65万英镑左右。而男方呢，曾经是普华永道（PwC）的注册会计师，净资产约为85万英镑，但是大多数都绑在与父母共有的一处房产中。
结婚那天，两人签了一份“互不追责型”的婚前协议，约定各自保留自身财产，共同财产按比例分割，离婚时不再提出任何财务要求。双方在签署协议时都进行了资产披露，意在增强协议的可执行力。
听起来应该很公平，而且，这个协议是双方在签署前都做了资产披露的，意思是——大家都把自己的身家透明地摆出来，彼此有个数，离婚时谁都不欠谁。然而，案件的关键转折点在于：妻子在签署协议时故意隐瞒了大量资产。
所以，后来在离婚的时候，男方翻脸了，事情闹到法院。他发现，女方仅仅只披露了大概1800万英镑的资产，但实际上她当时的资产还有6600万英镑！
法院怎么说？
在财务分配程序中，妻子辩称她并不清楚自己全部的资产状况，且由于害怕父亲，不敢询问详细信息。一开始，一审法官还是比较偏向女方的。法官接受了她的解释，认为她已经尽力讲出实情。
对于男方，法官认为——他不能仅仅因为资产披露数额偏低就否认婚前协议的效力，尤其是在他清楚妻子非常富有的前提下。加之这段婚姻较短且没有子女，婚前协议应当得到尊重。
尽管协议中写明丈夫在离婚时不应获得任何补偿，法官也没有完全无视现实。所以，他最终仍依据“基本生活需求”为其裁定了一笔40万英镑的赔偿金。
丈夫还是觉得不公平，立马提出上诉。他质疑婚前协议的有效性，并认为自己的“需求”被低估。简而言之，这个协议根本就是建立在虚假信息上，凭什么算数？
上诉法院怎么判？
上诉法院这回可就没那么轻信女方了。在上诉中，关键事实得以揭示：第一，妻子并非“不知道”自己的资产，而是刻意隐瞒，理由是她和父亲担心“涉税问题”；第二，她披露的资产为1800万英镑，但实际上她的真实资产为6600万英镑，确实故意隐瞒了73%的财产。
根据法院提供的资料看，本案核心参考判例是英国最高法院在Granatino v Radmacher [2011]中确立的原则：在判断婚前协议是否应被尊重时，第一步是要看协议是否存在法律上的瑕疵，例如强迫、欺诈或虚假陈述等。
上诉法院认为，这不是“小错误”——一审法官未进行这一必要分析。如果进行分析，他们理应认定妻子的蓄意不披露行为已构成“严重的欺诈性隐瞒”，从而使得婚前协议无效。
法院进一步指出，尽管法律并不强制要求签署婚前协议前必须进行资产披露或获得法律建议，但如果当事人自行承诺进行全面披露，却又故意隐瞒资产，那么这种行为将破坏协议的诚信基础，剥夺了对方做出知情决定的权利。
此外，法院还认为一审法院在评估丈夫的生活需求时，没有充分考虑夫妻在婚姻期间的生活水平，且受到了无效婚前协议的影响，从而误判了丈夫的经济需要。
因此，上诉法院决定：
原审判决被撤销；
婚前协议无效；
最终，案子将要发回高等法院，重新评估男方可以拿到多少钱。
丽莎评论
本案再次强调了在婚姻财务安排中透明和诚实的重要性：故意隐瞒资产可能会使婚前协议完全失效。尽管婚前协议在高净值人群中越来越常见，但其可执行性仍依赖于公平与知情同意。上诉法院的裁决传达出一个明确的信息：如果一方在签署协议时故意隐瞒关键财务信息，即使婚姻较短且无子女，协议也可能因此被推翻。
同时，法院有义务严格依据法律原则进行分析，确保结果公正。这个案子对很多签婚前协议的人是个提醒：即使是在短暂、无子女的婚姻中，夫妻的生活水平和个体的经济需求，依然必须依据《1973年婚姻案件法》第25条进行全面考量。
今天的分享就到这里，如果您在离婚处理财产时遇到任何问题，请进一步联系丽莎律师行，我们的家庭法律师可以为您提供建议，协助您处理离婚事宜。
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![Two recent immigration tribunal decisions have highlighted important points of principle in UK immigration law: the requirement for procedural fairness in decision-making and the legal distinction between a grant of leave and the administrative issuance of a Biometric Residence Permit (BRP).
Both cases demonstrate the need for applicants and their representatives to be vigilant in challenging decisions where the Home Office may have acted outside established legal boundaries.
Namecard for article - Angel Wan in English
Procedural Fairness in Hong Kong BN(O) Applications
In R (KW) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, JR-2024-LON-002169, the Upper Tribunal considered a refusal under the Hong Kong British National (Overseas) route. The applicant, a Chinese national from Hong Kong, had been refused on the basis of a previous conviction. The Home Office gave decisive weight to a Hong Kong Court of Appeal judgment it had located independently online, without putting this material to the applicant for comment.
The Tribunal found this to be a clear breach of procedural fairness, observing that the applicant had effectively been “ambushed” by evidence not disclosed to them.
While the Court of Appeal’s decision in Balajigari v Home Secretary [2019] EWCA Civ 673 was not directly applicable, it was considered a useful authority on fairness in immigration decision-making. The refusal was therefore quashed, and the case must now be reconsidered by the Home Office.
This judgment reinforces that applicants must be given an opportunity to respond to any evidence relied upon by decision-makers. Failure to do so will amount to procedural unfairness, providing strong grounds for judicial review.
The Legal Status of Biometric Residence Permits
The second case, Guerrero (s104(4A); statutory abandonment; right of appeal) [2025] UKUT 00276 (IAC), concerned an asylum seeker who received a refusal decision but was subsequently issued with a BRP stating “Refugee leave to remain.”
The First-tier Tribunal initially ruled that the BRP constituted a grant of leave, thereby treating the pending asylum appeal as abandoned under section 104(4A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
On appeal, the Upper Tribunal clarified the legal position. A BRP does not in itself grant leave to remain, it is an administrative document that evidences an earlier grant of leave.
Where a BRP is issued in error, no grant of leave arises, and an appeal cannot be deemed abandoned.
The Tribunal also confirmed that decisions to treat appeals as abandoned under section 104(4A) are not “excluded decisions,” and therefore fall within the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review.
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside, and the case will be re-heard.
This decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between the substantive grant of leave and the administrative issuance of a BRP. Mistaken issuance of documents cannot override statutory rights of appeal.
Conclusion
Both cases serve as reminders of the importance of legal safeguards in the immigration system when it comes to immigration tribunal decisions. The KW case highlights that applicants must be given a fair opportunity to respond to evidence before adverse decisions are made. The Guerrero case confirms that a BRP is not determinative of immigration status and cannot substitute for an actual grant of leave.
These judgments illustrate the value of expert legal representation in holding the Home Office to account where decision-making falls short of the standards required by law.](https://lisaslaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AdobeStock_284883829-scaled.jpeg "Gold coin Stack On the table save money Taking care of money - Lisa's Law Solicitors")
