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Clients need to be able to speak openly with their solicitors. Legal professional privilege protects qualifying communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or conducting litigation. But does that protection still apply if the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) is investigating the solicitor?

In Carter-Ruck Solicitors and another v Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd [2026] EWHC 2416 (KB), the High Court held that the SRA cannot use a notice under section 44B of the Solicitors Act 1974 to compel production of material protected by a client’s legal professional privilege if the client has not waived it.

White Namecard for article - Frankie in English

Written by Frankie Ng, Litigation Supervisor

 

How did the dispute arise?

The SRA was investigating Carter-Ruck and one of its partners in connection with work undertaken for a client. The firm and the client denied wrongdoing. As part of its investigation, the SRA issued notices requiring the firm to produce documents from the client’s files. The client did not agree to waive privilege, and the firm and client asked the court to decide whether the notices could compel production of privileged material.

The SRA argued that access to such material could be important when investigating complaints about a solicitor, particularly where the complaint came from someone other than the client. The court’s task was to decide whether Parliament had given the SRA that power under section 44B.

 

Why did the court rule against the SRA?

Legal professional privilege is the client’s right. The judge held that section 44B did not expressly override it. Nor was overriding it a necessary implication of the SRA’s power to demand documents. The fact that privileged communications might help an investigation was not enough to take away that right.

The ruling does not make an entire client file immune from an SRA request. A file can contain both privileged and non-privileged documents. It also does not prevent a client from choosing to waive privilege and provide material to the SRA, for example when making a complaint about their own solicitor.

The judgment concerns investigative notices under section 44B. The judge distinguished those notices from the SRA’s powers when it intervenes in a solicitor’s practice. The decision should therefore not be read as saying that the SRA can never obtain privileged documents through another lawful process.

 

What does this mean for clients?

If your solicitor is investigated, you do not automatically lose privilege over your communications with them. Under the power considered in this case, the SRA cannot compel your solicitor to hand over privileged material against your wishes.

Equally, confidentiality and privilege are different. A document is not privileged simply because it is private or marked “confidential”. Whether privilege applies depends on the nature and purpose of the communication.

The judgment gives clients reassurance on a fundamental point: their right to legal professional privilege does not disappear because their solicitor is under investigation. The court’s ruling is specific to the SRA’s section 44B power where the client has not waived that right.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

Not sure which service you need? Get in touch and we’ll help you identify the right team.

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James Cook

The Government has confirmed that its national Digital ID programme has been cancelled and will not proceed in the form previously proposed. This includes the proposed requirement for employers to use digital ID for all right to work checks.

The Government’s response was published on 18 September 2026 following the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee’s report on the Government’s plans for digital ID.

The cancellation of the national programme does not, however, mean that the Government is moving away from digital identity or digital immigration status checks. Existing eVisa arrangements will continue, while work on Digital Verification Services (DVS), GOV.UK One Login, the GOV.UK Wallet and other government-issued digital credentials will continue separately.

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Written by Beryl Gao, Legal Assistant

 

National Digital ID programme cancelled

The Government has confirmed that the national Digital ID programme considered by the Home Affairs Committee will not proceed.

As part of the proposed programme, the Government had considered making digital right to work checks mandatory. That proposal will also not be introduced.

Employers will therefore not be required to use a national Digital ID system for every right to work check.

The Government has stated that the cancellation applies specifically to the national Digital ID programme. Other digital identity initiatives that pre-date that programme will continue under their existing arrangements.

 

Right to work checks remain mandatory

The cancellation does not change employers’ existing obligations in relation to right to work checks.

Employers will continue to be required to conduct the prescribed right to work checks before employing individuals where such checks are required. The Government will not, however, require all employer right to work checks to be conducted digitally.

This means that the existing framework for right to work checks remains in place, rather than being replaced by a single mandatory digital system.

The Home Office is expected to issue updated guidance to employers as the new arrangements are implemented.

 

Digital Verification Services from 1 October 2026

Although a mandatory national Digital ID system will not be introduced, employers will still be able to use approved Digital Verification Services for prescribed digital right to work checks.

From 1 October 2026, an employer choosing to use a DVS for a prescribed digital right to work check will need to use a service that:

  • is certified against the relevant DVS Trust Framework;
  • meets the supplementary code for digital right to work checks; and
  • appears on the statutory DVS register as an approved service.

 

These requirements are relevant to an employer seeking to obtain a statutory excuse through the digital checking process. Employers will not be required to choose the digital route simply because approved DVS providers are available.

The Government has stated that the DVS framework will continue to be developed and maintained by the Office for Digital Identities and Attributes (OfDIA).

 

Existing eVisa arrangements will continue

The cancellation of the national Digital ID programme does not affect the existing eVisa system.

The Government has confirmed that eVisas will continue to provide digital evidence of immigration status. The proposal to incorporate eVisas into the national Digital ID programme no longer arises because that programme has been cancelled.

Individuals who use the Home Office online service to demonstrate their immigration status will therefore continue to use the existing arrangements, including where their status is evidenced through an eVisa.

The Government has also stated that digital status checks are already widely used and that support and alternative arrangements remain available for individuals who experience problems with their digital status.

 

Continued development of digital identity

The cancellation of the national Digital ID programme should not be understood as a reversal of the Government’s wider move towards digital identity.

The Government has confirmed that a number of separate initiatives will continue, including:

  • the statutory Digital Verification Services regime;
  • GOV.UK One Login;
  • the GOV.UK Wallet; and
  • government-issued digital credentials.

 

These initiatives are separate from the cancelled national Digital ID programme and will continue to be developed under their respective arrangements.

The Government has also stated that any future proposals involving legislation or significant changes to digital identity will be subject to appropriate assessment, consultation and parliamentary scrutiny.

 

Immigration enforcement and right to work checks

The Government has confirmed that Immigration Enforcement will continue to take an intelligence-led approach to tackling illegal working.

It has also announced an additional £5 million investment in Immigration Enforcement to target, arrest, detain and return illegal workers. The Government intends to continue working with OfDIA and DVS providers to consider how information generated through digital right to work checks can be reported and used for enforcement purposes where this can be done lawfully and securely.

 

What this means in practice

The cancellation of the national Digital ID programme means that employers will not be required to move to a single mandatory digital system for all right to work checks.

At the same time, digital verification remains an important part of the UK’s immigration and employment compliance framework. Employers will continue to have a legal obligation to carry out the prescribed right to work checks, while those choosing to use a DVS for digital checks will need to ensure that the service they use satisfies the relevant statutory requirements from 1 October 2026.

For individuals, existing arrangements for demonstrating immigration status through the Home Office online service, including the use of eVisas, will remain in place.

The Government’s latest position therefore represents a change to the proposed national Digital ID programme, rather than an end to the UK’s wider development of digital immigration and identity systems.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

Not sure which service you need? Get in touch and we’ll help you identify the right team.

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James Cook

Tribunal accepts client’s evidence of more than 20 years’ continuous residence in the UK despite limited documentary evidence

We are pleased to share the successful outcome of a recent immigration appeal conducted by myself and assisted by my legal assistant Beryl Gao before the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) at Taylor House Tribunal Hearing Centre.

The appeal concerned an individual who had lived in the UK for more than 20 years but faced significant difficulties in providing documentary evidence covering the entirety of his residence.

Following detailed preparation and presentation of the evidence, the Immigration Judge accepted the Appellant’s account and found that he had resided continuously in the UK for more than 20 years. The appeal was allowed on the day of the hearing.

Victor Falcon Mmegwa - Namecard

Written by Victor Falcon Mmegwa, Senior Associate Solicitor

Background to the case

The Appellant, a national of China, entered the UK on 17 October 2005 and claimed asylum shortly afterwards. His asylum claim was refused on 25 October 2005, and his appeal rights were exhausted on 23 December 2005.

The Appellant subsequently made an application for leave to remain. That application was refused by the Respondent, resulting in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal.

A central issue in the appeal was whether the Appellant had established continuous residence in the UK for more than 20 years.

 

The challenge: limited documentary evidence

One of the difficulties faced by the Appellant was that he did not have documentary evidence covering every year of his residence in the UK.

The Respondent disputed his account of continuous residence.

The Appellant explained the difficulties he had experienced during his time in the UK, including periods of irregular status, irregular work and homelessness. These circumstances were relevant to why he was unable to produce extensive documentary evidence covering the entire period.

We therefore prepared the case to address not only the documents that were available but also the Appellant’s detailed account and supporting witness evidence.

 

Witness evidence

The Appellant was supported by witnesses who had known him for many years.

Their evidence was important because they were able to explain their longstanding relationship with the Appellant, their knowledge of his circumstances and their understanding of his continued presence in the UK.

We submitted that the witness evidence supported the Appellant’s account and should be considered alongside the documentary evidence and his own evidence.

 

Immigration Judge accepts the Appellant’s evidence

The Immigration Judge accepted that the lack of extensive documentary evidence did not, in the circumstances of this particular case, undermine the Appellant’s account.

The Judge stated:

“It is certainly plausible, in my judgment, that an individual with irregular status, who has no right to work and no home, would find it very difficult to provide documentary evidence of their stay in the United Kingdom.”

The Judge also found:

“There is no credible evidence which undermines the appellant’s account of continuous residence. There are no records to suggest that he has left the UK.”

The Judge accepted the evidence of the witnesses and found that they would have known if the Appellant had left the UK.

The Judge ultimately concluded:

“Considering the case as a whole, I am satisfied that the appellant has not left the United Kingdom and that the failure to provide documentary evidence is indicative of the irregular work and periods of homelessness that he encountered.”

The Judge then found:

“I am satisfied that the appellant meets the substance of the Immigration Rules and that, as at the date of the hearing, he has resided continuously in the United Kingdom for more than twenty years.”

 

Outcome: Appeal Allowed

The Tribunal therefore allowed the appeal on the day of the hearing, accepting the Appellant’s evidence that he had resided continuously in the UK for more than 20 years.

What can this case demonstrate?

This case highlights the importance of presenting a carefully prepared and properly evidenced immigration appeal, particularly where an individual has difficulty obtaining documents covering a lengthy period of residence.

Not every person who has lived in the UK for a long period will have documentary evidence for every year. In appropriate cases, other evidence including credible witness evidence and a detailed and consistent account of an individual’s circumstances may assist the Tribunal in assessing the evidence as a whole.

However, every case is fact-specific, and the evidence required will depend on the individual circumstances of the case.

 

How Lisa’s Law Solicitors can help

At Lisa’s Law Solicitors, we understand that long-residence cases can involve complex evidential issues.

We take detailed instructions from our clients, carefully examine the available evidence and identify what further evidence may assist in presenting their case.

We also provide advice and representation throughout the immigration and appeal process, including preparation for hearings before the First-tier Tribunal.

If you have lived in the UK for a significant period and are concerned about your immigration status or your ability to evidence your residence, our immigration team can advise you on your individual circumstances.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

Not sure which service you need? Get in touch and we’ll help you identify the right team.

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James Cook

We recently acted for a client who had entered into an annual membership contract. The factual setting below has been changed to preserve confidentiality, but the legal issues and outcome are based on a matter handled by Lisa’s Law.

White Namecard for article - Paul Cheuk in English (1)

Written by Paul Cheuk, Solicitor

 

Our client was unsure whether to renew his membership for another year because he might be relocating overseas. He explained this concern to the company’s sales representative before signing. The representative reassured him that if the relocation went ahead, he would be able to cancel. That reassurance was important to our client, and he relied on it when deciding to renew.

Several months later, the relocation was confirmed. Within a few hours, our client contacted the same sales representative through WhatsApp and said that he needed to cancel. The representative received and acknowledged the message, and our client reasonably believed that he had done what was required.

The company later took a different position. It demanded payment for the remainder of the annual contract and relied on its online terms. Those terms said that cancellation had to be made within 48 hours of the relevant event and, importantly, had to be sent to a particular email address. The company therefore argued that the WhatsApp message to the salesperson did not amount to a valid cancellation. That was where the real dispute began.

 

The 48 Hour Rule Had Never Been Mentioned

The company’s position was that our client had entered into the contract and was therefore bound by its standard terms, including the 48 hour cancellation requirement. However, our client had specifically discussed cancellation with the salesperson before entering into the agreement. He had explained the exact uncertainty which was preventing him from committing, and the salesperson had answered that concern by telling him that he would be able to cancel if the relocation went ahead.

There had been no mention during that conversation of a 48 hour deadline. There had also been no explanation that cancellation would only be accepted if notice was sent to one particular email address. These were significant restrictions because failure to comply with them could leave the customer liable for the whole annual contract.

This was therefore not simply a case of a customer saying that he had failed to read the terms. Our client had raised the very issue before signing and the business had chosen to answer him. Our position was that the effect of that answer had to be considered alongside the written terms which the company later sought to enforce.

 

Can the Website Terms Still Apply?

A business is entitled to use online terms and conditions, and a term does not become invalid merely because it appears through a website or hyperlink. However, whether a particular term has properly become part of the contract can still be an important legal question.

English contract law has long recognised that greater steps may be required to draw particularly unusual or onerous terms to the other party’s attention. The well known decision in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd illustrates this principle. The court considered whether sufficient notice had been given of an unusually burdensome term before the contract was made.

Our argument was not that every 48 hour cancellation period must therefore be invalid. The issue was the particular way in which this restriction operated in our client’s case. The term determined whether he remained liable for an entire year of payments, yet when he expressly raised the question of cancellation before entering the agreement, the restriction was not mentioned at all.

The same difficulty arose with the requirement to use a particular email address. If a business intends to insist upon a very specific method of cancellation, particularly where failure to follow it can result in substantial liability, the way in which that requirement was presented to the consumer may become highly relevant.

 

Our Client Had Acted Within the 48 Hours Anyway

There was also a further problem with the company’s position on the cancellation clause. Our client had not delayed. He contacted the sales representative within hours of receiving confirmation that the relocation would take place.

He used WhatsApp because this was the same communication channel which the company itself had used during the sales process. His cancellation was in writing, it reached the company’s own representative, and receipt of the message was acknowledged. The company nevertheless argued that this did not count because its standard terms required notice to be sent to a specific email address.

The question was therefore not simply whether the word “email” appeared somewhere in the standard terms. We challenged whether the company could fairly rely on that technical distinction when the requirement had not been explained during the discussion about cancellation and the company had in fact received clear written notification within the stated 48 hour period.

 

The Consumer Rights Act Also Matters

Because this was a consumer contract, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 also had to be considered. Under section 62, an unfair term in a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer. The court may consider whether the term causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer and whether it is contrary to the requirement of good faith.

Importantly, this assessment is not necessarily carried out by looking at one clause in isolation. The circumstances in which the contract was entered into may also matter. In our case, that meant considering the sales conversation, why our client had been hesitant to enter into the agreement, what reassurance he had been given, how the 48 hour restriction was presented, and what he actually did when the circumstances for cancellation arose.

Consumer protection guidance also warns businesses against relying on small print in a way which undermines what consumers have been told during the sales process. Again, this does not mean that every strict cancellation clause is unfair. It does mean that the way the clause was presented and the surrounding sales representations can be important.

 

Why the WhatsApp Messages Mattered

The written messages were central to the case. They allowed us to demonstrate what our client had asked before entering into the contract, what the representative had told him, and how the company itself had chosen to communicate during the sales process.

The later messages were equally important. They showed that our client had acted within hours once the reason for cancellation arose. They also showed that his cancellation had actually reached the salesperson. This meant that we were able to challenge the company’s case from several directions.

This is why we regularly advise clients to preserve the full history of their communications once a dispute develops. A short WhatsApp conversation which seemed unimportant at the time may later become some of the strongest evidence in the case.

 

The Company Eventually Changed Its Position

We wrote to the company setting out the chronology and the legal basis of our client’s position. We did not simply argue that the outcome was unfair. We addressed what had been said before the agreement, the status of the online terms, the 48 hour requirement, the specified method of notice, and the fact that our client had in fact notified the company through WhatsApp within the relevant period.

The company eventually reconsidered its position regarding the cancellation clause. It agreed to release our client from the contract and no longer sought to rely on the strict cancellation provisions. The substantial payment demanded from him was therefore no longer pursued.

At Lisa’s Law, we look at that complete picture. Sometimes the messages exchanged before and after a contract was signed can be just as important as the small print itself.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

Not sure which service you need? Get in touch and we’ll help you identify the right team.

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James Cook

Building safety defects continue to create uncertainty for leaseholders and prospective buyers of flats. Issues such as unsafe cladding, inadequate fire-stopping and structural defects can lead to significant remediation costs, delays and difficulties when selling or remortgaging a property.

The proposed Remediation Bill seeks to address some of these concerns and support the remediation of unsafe buildings. However, it remains proposed legislation, and its wording may change during the parliamentary process.

Copy of Namecard for article - Jackie in English 1

Written by Jackie Lam, Solicitor

 

Why does remediation matter?

Following the Grenfell Tower tragedy, building safety became a major concern across the residential property sector. Investigations have identified various defects in some residential buildings, including issues relating to external wall systems, fire safety measures, compartmentation and structural integrity.

Remediation works can be costly and technically complex. They may involve specialist investigations, professional reports, approvals and extensive construction.

For leaseholders, the consequences can extend beyond the condition of the building. They may face uncertainty about service charges, future costs and the timing of remedial works. Unresolved safety issues may also lead buyers, valuers and mortgage lenders to request additional information.

 

How does the proposed Remediation Bill relate to the Building Safety Act 2022?

The Building Safety Act 2022 already provides protections for certain leaseholders in relation to historic building safety defects. However, those protections are subject to statutory conditions and do not apply in every case.

The position may depend on the building, the nature and date of the defect, the leaseholder’s circumstances and the way in which the relevant costs are being claimed.

The proposed Bill is intended to support a more structured and enforceable process. Depending on its final wording, it may introduce clearer obligations, deadlines or consequences for parties responsible for carrying out or funding remediation.

The exact effect of the legislation will depend on the final version of the Bill and any regulations or guidance made under it.

 

What should leaseholders do?

Leaseholders should obtain clear, written information from the freeholder or managing agent about:

  • identified defects and relevant professional reports;
  • proposed remediation works and their expected timetable;
  • responsibility for carrying out and funding the works; and
  • any current or anticipated service charge liability.

 

They should retain copies of all correspondence, notices and service charge demands. Before disputing or withholding payment, leaseholders should obtain appropriate advice, as non-payment may have serious consequences under the lease.

 

What should buyers consider?

A prospective buyer should investigate building safety issues before committing to a purchase. Relevant enquiries may include:

  • the building’s height, construction and external wall system;
  • whether the building has known or suspected defects;
  • whether remediation works have started or are planned;
  • who is responsible for funding the works;
  • whether leaseholders may have to contribute; and
  • whether the buyer’s mortgage lender has specific requirements.

 

The lease and management information should also be reviewed carefully, particularly the provisions dealing with service charges, repairs, insurance and recovery of costs.

Although the proposed Bill may improve certainty in the longer term, it should not be treated as a guarantee that a transaction will proceed without delay. Each property must be assessed based on the information available at the time.

 

How can Lisa’s Law assist?

The proposed Remediation Bill is part of the continuing development of the UK’s building safety framework. While its final effect remains to be seen, leaseholders and buyers should continue to obtain clear information and take advice on how the existing law applies to their circumstances.

Lisa’s Law can assist leaseholders and prospective buyers with related property enquiries, including reviewing lease provisions, considering remediation information, raising appropriate conveyancing enquiries and advising on issues that may affect a sale, purchase or remortgage. Please contact our property team if you require assistance with a property affected by building safety or remediation concerns.

Disclaimer: This article is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. The Remediation Bill is currently proposed legislation, and its wording, scope and effect may change during the parliamentary process. Readers should obtain advice on their individual circumstances based on the law in force at the relevant time.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

Not sure which service you need? Get in touch and we’ll help you identify the right team.

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James Cook

Somewhere you will have picked up that the starting point when it comes to asset division in divorce is half. It is the first thing most people are told, and for a small number of cases it is roughly right. But English law does not begin from a fixed split, and in most divorces the sharing principle is not what decides how the assets are divided at all.

Now you are looking at a house you bought with a deposit from your grandmother’s estate, or a business you built before you ever met your spouse, and half does not feel like the right answer. It often is not.

This article is about England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own rules and they differ in important ways. Everything below applies in the same way to ending a civil partnership. It does not apply to couples who lived together without marrying. There is no such thing as a common law spouse, and a cohabiting partner has none of the claims described here, however long the relationship lasted.

Namecard for article - Yi Ling English

Written by Yi Ling Lio, Private Client Paralegal

 

Is everything split 50/50 in a divorce?

No, and the reason is in the statute. The court’s powers come from section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which gives a judge a list of factors to weigh rather than a sum to work out: the income, property and resources each of you has or is likely to have, your financial needs and obligations, the standard of living during the marriage, your ages and the length of the marriage, and the contributions each of you made, including looking after the home and raising children. First consideration goes to the welfare of any child of the family under eighteen.

There is no calculation in there. Two couples with identical balance sheets can end up with different orders, because the factors pull differently depending on the facts. Needs is what decides most cases, and it does not mean basic subsistence. It is measured against the life and assets the two of you built up during the marriage.

That is also why a solicitor’s first answer to “what will I get” is usually a version of “it depends”, and why any source that gives you a confident percentage before knowing your circumstances is telling you something it cannot know.

 

What the sharing principle actually covers

The idea that marriage is a partnership of equals comes from White v White [2000] UKHL 54. The House held that a proposed division should be checked against the yardstick of equality, and that there is no discrimination between the spouse who earned the money and the spouse who ran the home. Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 developed this into three reasons a court might make an award: needs, compensation, and sharing. Compensation is aimed at a spouse who gave up a career for the marriage and is left worse off as a result. It is argued far more often than it succeeds.

Sharing applies to matrimonial property. That means, broadly, what the two of you built up during the marriage through your joint endeavour, whoever’s name it sits in: salary earned during the marriage, pensions accrued during the marriage, savings, the family home.

A business can be harder. Where it was built up entirely during the marriage, it goes into the pot like anything else. Where it existed before you married but grew while you were together, how much of that growth counts as matrimonial is often the whole argument, and there is no set arithmetic for splitting it. Growth that came from one spouse’s active work is treated differently from growth that would have happened anyway. If a business is the main asset, take advice early rather than assume you know the answer.

Non-matrimonial property is what one of you brought in from outside, such as assets owned before the marriage, an inheritance, or a gift from your family. That is where the court begins, not where it always ends up. Two things can pull those assets back in: the way you treated them during the marriage, and need.

 

Are inherited or pre-marital assets protected in a divorce?

The Supreme Court looked at this in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26. The wealth in that case came largely from the husband’s career before the marriage. In 2017 he transferred assets worth around £77.8 million to his wife, with the intention that she would settle them into trusts for their children and take the money outside his estate for inheritance tax purposes. The trusts were never set up. When the marriage ended, the wife argued that the transfer had converted the money into matrimonial property, to be shared.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The sharing principle applies to matrimonial property and not to non-matrimonial property. What mattered was where the assets came from and how the couple had treated them, not whose name they happened to be in. The transfer had been made for the children and for tax planning, not in order to share the wealth with the wife, so moving it across did not change its character.

The Court of Appeal had treated 75 per cent of the 2017 assets as non-matrimonial and 25 per cent as matrimonial, shared the matrimonial part equally, and reduced the wife’s award from £45 million at trial to £25 million. The Supreme Court upheld that outcome.

 

When does a separate asset become shared?

An asset that started out as one person’s can come over time to be treated by both of you as shared. The term for that is matrimonialisation. Standish reframed the test. It is not whether your situation fits a narrow category, but whether the way the two of you dealt with the asset over the course of the marriage shows you were treating it as shared. It happens in ordinary ways:

  • The family home. An inherited property, or one owned before the marriage, will very often be treated as matrimonial if it becomes the home you both live in and treat as yours, whatever its origin. The family home is the asset most readily absorbed into the pot.
  • Mixing. Inherited money paid into a joint account, used to reduce the joint mortgage, or spent on an extension is hard to trace back out again years later. The longer it sits mixed in, the harder it is to argue it stayed separate.
  • Time. In a marriage of thirty years, where separate money was used to fund family life throughout, the distinction between “his”, “hers” and “ours” tends to erode on its own.

 

If keeping something separate matters to you, it needs both a record and, ideally, an agreement. Our article on prenuptial agreements sets out what makes one hold up, and a postnuptial agreement does the same job after the wedding.

 

Why needs decides most cases

Sharing only comes into play once both of you can be properly housed and supported. In most divorces, there is not enough for that.

Where the assets will not stretch to meet both parties’ needs, needs takes over and consumes the whole pot. And when it does, non-matrimonial property is not out of reach. A judge who cannot rehouse a parent and children any other way can and will look at inherited money or a pre-marital property to do it. The protection in Standish is secondary to needs. It governs how a surplus is shared, not whether a shortfall can be met.

In smaller cases, much of it turns on the children. The welfare of any child under eighteen is the court’s first consideration, and in practice that means housing the children and the parent they mainly live with tends to come before anything else. In a case where the capital barely covers one suitable home, rehousing that household is often what the available money goes on, and the question of who “brought in” what falls away.

That does not always mean handing inherited money over outright. Where a judge does reach into non-matrimonial property to meet a need, it can be done more cautiously, for example by a charge, so the capital comes back to you later. There is no simple yes or no on whether an inheritance is safe. The further your other assets fall short of what both of you need, the more exposed it becomes.

Needs is assessed generously, measured against the standard of living you had during the marriage and the length of that marriage. It covers a home and an income. For most families, an order is really an answer to two practical questions: where does everybody live, and what does each of you have to live on.

 

Will I have to sell the house?

Sometimes, but it is not the only outcome. Where there is enough elsewhere, one of you may be able to buy the other out and keep the house. Where there is not, the court can order a sale and divide the proceeds. In between, it can push the decision back. An order can let one parent and the children stay in the home for a period, often until the youngest finishes school, with the house sold and the proceeds split at that point (sometimes called a Mesher order). Which route fits depends on whether the figures can rehouse both of you, and that comes back to needs.

 

Will there be maintenance?

Not always. Where both of you can support yourselves, the court will try to cut the financial tie between you completely, which is known as a clean break. Where one of you cannot, maintenance fills the gap, and most orders now run for a fixed term rather than for life, on the basis that the person receiving it is expected to become financially independent where they realistically can. A clean break is also often what shapes the deal, with one of you taking a larger share of the capital in exchange for giving up any claim to maintenance.

 

What happens to pensions?

Pensions are routinely overlooked and are often the second most valuable asset in the marriage, sometimes the most valuable. They can be shared by a pension sharing order. In a needs case the whole pension can be looked at, including anything built up before the marriage, so the neat line between matrimonial and non-matrimonial matters less here than people expect. The value on the annual statement is frequently a poor guide to what a pension is actually worth on divorce, which is why they are usually valued properly.

 

Do most people end up in court?

No. Most financial arrangements are agreed without a judge. You normally have to attend a mediation information meeting before you can apply to court, and judges now expect couples to have made a genuine attempt to sort things out away from court.

But an agreement on its own is not the end of it. To be binding, it needs to be turned into a consent order and approved by the court. Without that order, a former spouse can come back years later and make a claim.

There is a related trap worth knowing about. If you remarry before you have applied for a financial order, you lose the right to bring certain claims against your former spouse altogether. It is the application that has to be in, not the order that has to be made, so if your application is already lodged, remarrying does not shut you out. If it is not, it can. Our guide to divorce in England and Wales covers the timing.

 

What about a short marriage?

The length of the marriage is one of the section 25 factors, and it carries weight in a short marriage. Where a couple were together only a few years, kept their finances largely separate, and have no children, the court is more willing to try to put each of you back roughly where you started, instead of sharing everything down the middle. The Court of Appeal confirmed this in Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408. A departure from equality can be justified in a short, childless marriage where the couple kept their money largely separate.

But the departure there was partial, not a clean unwinding, and the court was clear this remains the exception. Needs still comes first. A short marriage that produced a child, or that left one person unable to support themselves, will not be dealt with as if the finances can simply be unwound.

 

Does it matter who caused the divorce?

Almost never. Divorce is now no fault, and the court is not asked to decide who was to blame for the marriage ending. Conduct is one of the section 25 factors, but only where it would be inequitable to disregard it, and that is a high bar. An affair does not clear it. What can matter is conduct with a financial dimension: deliberately running assets down, reckless spending, or hiding money.

 

None of this works if the figures are wrong

Both sharing and needs depend entirely on the court knowing what is there. You each owe a duty of full and frank disclosure, and where it is breached the court can draw adverse inferences and resolve the uncertainty against the person who created it. If the disclosed finances do not match the life you lived together, that gap is the thing to raise, and raise early. Our article on hiding assets in divorce covers what the court does when a spouse will not be straight about money.

 

In summary

There is no formula. Section 25 gives the court a broad discretion, and the welfare of any child under eighteen comes first. The sharing principle starts at equality, but it applies to what you built up together during the marriage, not to everything either of you owns, and following Standish inherited and pre-marital assets are not automatically shared. What matters is where they came from and how the two of you treated them.

But a separate asset can still become shared over time, the family home most readily of all, and in most divorces it is needs rather than sharing that decides the outcome. Where needs cannot otherwise be met, non-matrimonial assets can be used to meet them. If there is something you want to keep separate, record it and take advice on a nuptial agreement while things are calm, which is far cheaper than arguing about it later. And if any of this touches your own situation, get advice early, before positions harden and costs start climbing.

 

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice.

 

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James Cook

One of the most common things I hear from clients faced with a default judgment is: “I knew nothing about the claim. The papers went to my old address, so the judgment must be invalid.” It is an entirely understandable reaction. Unfortunately, the legal position is not always that simple.

A default judgment is usually entered because a defendant did not respond to a claim within the required time. By the time the defendant discovers it, enforcement may already have begun and the judgment may be affecting their credit record. The immediate instinct is often to focus only on non-receipt. In my view, that is where many applications risk going wrong. The court will want to know not merely whether the defendant actually read the papers, but whether the claim was legally served and, if it was, whether there is a proper basis for reopening the case.

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Written by Frankie Ng, Litigation Supervisor

Service at a last known address

For an individual, the court rules may permit a claim form to be served at the defendant’s usual or last known residence. This means that service can be valid even though the defendant had moved, was living overseas, could not gain access to the property or simply never collected the post. Actual receipt and valid service are not always the same thing.

That does not give a claimant a free hand to use an address which they know is obsolete. If the claimant has reason to believe that the defendant no longer lives there, the claimant must take reasonable steps to find the current address. If a current address is found, it should normally be used. Subsequently, if it cannot be found, the claimant may need to consider another place or method of service and, where appropriate, apply to the court for permission.

The facts are therefore crucial. Had the defendant told the claimant about the move? Were the parties communicating by email or telephone? Had correspondence been returned? Did the claimant possess documents showing another address? A bare statement that the claim was not received is rarely enough. The evidence should address what the claimant knew, or ought reasonably to have appreciated, when service took place.

 

When the court must set the judgment aside

Under CPR 13.2, the court must set aside a default judgment if it was wrongly entered. This may arise where the claim form was not validly served, where judgment was obtained before the time for responding had expired, where the defendant had already filed the necessary response in time, or where the whole claim had been satisfied before judgment was entered.

This is sometimes described as the mandatory route. The label should not create false confidence. The applicant still needs to establish the facts showing why judgment was wrongly entered. In a dispute about an old address, the chronology and documentary evidence will often be more persuasive than a general assertion of unfairness.

 

When the court has a discretion

If the judgment was regularly entered, the position changes. Under CPR 13.3, the court may set it aside or vary it if the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim, or if there is some other good reason why the judgment should be set aside or the defendant should be allowed to defend.

A real prospect of success means a defence with genuine substance. It is more than saying, “I disagree with the claim.” The court will normally expect the proposed defence to be explained clearly and supported, where possible, by documents. For that reason, I generally regard the draft defence as one of the most important parts of the application. It shows the judge that setting the judgment aside would serve a useful purpose and lead to a real issue being tried.

 

Promptness can decide the application

The rules expressly require the court to consider whether the application was made promptly. In practice, every unexplained period of delay can make the task more difficult. A defendant should not wait until a bailiff attends, money is taken from a bank account or a charging order is pursued before seeking advice. Once the judgment becomes known, the sensible approach is to obtain the court papers immediately, investigate service, gather the relevant evidence and prepare the application without delay.

It is also important to remember that applying to set aside the judgment does not automatically suspend enforcement. Where enforcement has begun or is threatened, a separate request for a stay may be required. This is a practical point which can be overlooked when all attention is directed towards the eventual set-aside hearing.

 

What the court will expect to see

A properly prepared application will usually include an application notice, a witness statement giving a clear and honest chronology, a draft order and a draft defence. Evidence of residence, moving dates, travel, correspondence, notification of a new address and the date on which the judgment first came to light may all be relevant. The applicant should also explain the reason for any failure to respond and any subsequent delay.

The court may refuse the application, set the judgment aside, vary it or impose conditions, such as requiring money to be paid into court. Costs orders are also possible. Even where judgment is set aside, a defendant may be ordered to pay costs caused by their own default or delay.

 

Lisa’s Law’s practical view

A default judgment should never be treated as a minor administrative problem. Equally, a defendant should not assume that the case is hopeless simply because papers were sent to an old address. The right approach is to examine service and the underlying defence together. A strong technical point on service may be decisive, but where service was valid, prompt action and a well-evidenced defence may still provide a route forward.

Above all, the application must tell a coherent story: what happened, why the claim was not answered, when the judgment was discovered and why there is a genuine defence deserving to be heard. That is far more persuasive than relying on non-receipt alone.

 

How we can help

Lisa’s Law can review the service history and underlying claim, advise on prospects, prepare the application and supporting evidence, seek a stay of enforcement where appropriate, and represent the defendant at the hearing.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

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James Cook

Asbestos is a collective term for several naturally occurring fibrous minerals that were widely used in construction in the 20th century because of their strength, resistance to heat and fire, chemical stability and insulating properties.

In the UK, asbestos-containing materials were commonly installed in homes built or refurbished before 1999 and can be found in textured coatings, floor tiles, cement products, insulation boards, pipe and boiler lagging, and some adhesives.

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Written by Lok Lo, Solicitor

 

What are the risks of asbestos?

Asbestos typically presents less risk while it remains sealed, intact and undisturbed. Hazard arises when asbestos-containing materials are damaged or disturbed by activities such as cutting, drilling, sanding or breaking, which releases microscopic fibres into the air.

If inhaled, these fibres can lodge in the lungs and, over many years, may lead to serious diseases including mesothelioma, lung cancer and asbestosis. The level of risk depends on factors such as the asbestos type, the material’s condition, the quantity of fibre released, and the duration and frequency of exposure. Consequently, asbestos in good condition is often managed and monitored rather than removed immediately.

 

What impact can asbestos have?

The presence of asbestos in a property does not automatically reduce its market value, but it can affect buyer confidence and lenders’ willingness to proceed, particularly where surveys identify deteriorating or high risk materials or where substantial remediation costs are expected.

In practice, asbestos concerns can lead to lower offers, extended negotiations or delays in completing a sale. Some buyers are deterred by potential health risks, future maintenance obligations and the cost of using specialist contractors and disposing of hazardous waste. Conversely, a professional asbestos survey confirming that materials are in good condition and can be safely managed often reassures buyers and limits any negative impact on value.

 

What should homeowners do if they find asbestos?

Homeowners are not generally legally required to remove asbestos or to commission an asbestos survey. However, any renovation or repair work must be carried out safely, and contractors undertaking intrusive works usually have duties to assess asbestos risks before starting. Refurbishment and demolition surveys are typically required where significant alterations are planned. Improper handling or removal can result in enforcement action, health risks and substantial clean-up costs.

Additional obligations may arise where a property is let or used partly for business, as health and safety law may require asbestos risks to be assessed and managed for tenants, visitors or workers. Sellers should also be aware that failing to disclose known asbestos issues, or providing inaccurate information during a transaction, may expose them to claims from buyers who suffer financial loss.

 

Should you buy a property with asbestos?

When buying an older property, particularly one built or refurbished before 2000, it is often advisable to commission an asbestos management survey. This survey identifies the presence, location and condition of asbestos-containing materials and sets out appropriate management options, which may include leaving materials in place, encapsulating, repairing or removing them.

Buyers should review this information with the surveyor and consider whether any relevant removal works are required. If significant asbestos issues are present, the parties may negotiate a price reduction, agree an allowance from the sale proceeds to fund future works, or require specified remediation to be completed before completion. Addressing these matters before exchange of contracts helps ensure that liabilities, costs and responsibilities are clear to all parties.

Lisa’s Law highly experienced residential property team can advise you on issues relating to asbestos in residential property transactions. Contact us today.

 

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Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

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James Cook

Equal pay disputes are not limited to employees doing the same job. A worker may be able to compare their pay with someone carrying out a completely different role if the two jobs are nevertheless regarded as being of equal value.

The recent Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in Next Retail Limited and Next Distribution Limited v Miss M Thandi and others [2026] EAT 130 provides an important reminder of how these rules work in practice, particularly where different parts of a workforce are paid different rates because of recruitment pressures, market conditions or operational requirements.

Next succeeded in overturning an earlier finding that it could not justify the difference in basic pay between its retail sales consultants and warehouse operatives. However, the Next equal pay appeal case does not establish that employers are free to pay different rates simply by referring to “market forces”.

The employer must still be able to identify and evidence the genuine reason for the difference and, where the difference puts one sex at a particular disadvantage, show that the arrangement is objectively justified.

Written by Peggy Lim, Solicitor

What happened in the Next case?

The claims were brought by thousands of Next retail sales consultants, most of whom were women. They compared themselves with warehouse operatives who received higher rates of basic pay.

An earlier Employment Tribunal decision had already determined that the work performed by the relevant retail employees was of equal value to the work performed by the warehouse comparators. That finding was not overturned on appeal.

The later dispute was therefore about whether Next could lawfully justify paying the warehouse employees more.

Next relied on a number of factors, including market rates, difficulties recruiting and retaining warehouse staff, the operational demands of its warehouses and wider business considerations. The Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded that, in relation to basic pay, the evidence showed that Next had paid higher rates in the warehouses because it needed to do so to recruit and retain sufficient staff. Those particular pressures did not apply in the same way to the retail workforce.

The important point is that the decision turned on the actual reason for the higher pay and the evidence supporting that reason.

 

What does “equal pay” mean?

The equal pay provisions are principally contained in the Equality Act 2010.

The law provides protection where a person is receiving less favourable contractual terms than a comparator of the opposite sex who is performing equal work.

Equal work can include:

  1. Like work – where the jobs are the same or broadly similar and any differences are not practically important.
  2. Work rated as equivalent – where the jobs have been rated as equivalent under an analytical job evaluation scheme.
  3. Work of equal value – where the jobs may be different but nevertheless place equal demands on the workers by reference to matters such as effort, skill and decision-making.

 

This means that different job titles do not necessarily prevent an equal pay claim.

A shop-floor employee, administrator, cleaner, warehouse operative or other worker could potentially compare their role with a very different job if the demands of the two roles are shown to be equivalent.

The assessment is concerned with the work actually carried out, rather than simply the wording of a job title or contract.

 

When can an employer lawfully pay different rates?

Equal work does not automatically mean that every difference in pay is unlawful.

Under section 69 of the Equality Act 2010, an employer may rely on the material factor defence where it can show that the difference is caused by a genuine factor which is not direct sex discrimination.

Depending on the circumstances, this may include recruitment and retention difficulties, genuine market-rate differences, particular skills or qualifications, geographical location, unsocial hours, additional responsibilities, productivity requirements, collective bargaining arrangements or historical contractual protections.

Where the factor places one sex at a particular disadvantage, the employer may also need to show that relying on it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

The Next decision confirms that a genuine need to attract and retain sufficient workers can justify higher pay. However, the employer must be able to show that those pressures actually existed. Simply referring to “market rates” will not necessarily be enough without evidence explaining why the higher rate was required.

 

 

What should employers do when there are differences in pay?

The Next decision is a useful reminder that employers should be able to explain how pay differences arose, why they continue to exist and whether they remain justified.

 

  1. Review the full remuneration package

Employers should look beyond headline salary and compare basic pay, overtime, bonuses, allowances, shift premiums, paid breaks and other contractual benefits. A relatively small difference in one element of pay can become significant when applied across a large workforce over several years.

 

  1. Identify and document the genuine reason for the difference

Where one group is paid more, the employer should be able to explain why. If the reason is recruitment difficulties, a skills shortage or market benchmarking, supporting evidence should be retained.

Useful evidence may include vacancy data, numbers of applicants, staff turnover, agency worker usage, competitor salary information and records showing that candidates were rejecting offers or employees were leaving because of pay. This was important in the Next case, where different recruitment and retention pressures in the warehouse workforce formed part of the justification for the higher pay.

 

  1. Review pay differentials regularly

A difference that was justified when it was introduced may not remain justified indefinitely. For example, a premium introduced because of serious recruitment difficulties may require reconsideration if those difficulties later disappear.

Employers should therefore periodically review whether the original reason for a pay differential still applies, rather than allowing historic arrangements to continue automatically.

 

  1. Consider gender patterns and equal pay reviews

Particular care should be taken where a lower-paid group is predominantly female and a higher-paid comparator group has a materially different gender profile. A statistical disparity does not automatically establish unlawful discrimination, but it may require the employer to objectively justify the relevant pay practice.

 

Employers may also wish to carry out an equal pay audit or job evaluation exercise to identify unexplained differences, assess whether roles may be comparable and address potential risks before they develop into formal disputes or litigation.

 

What should employees do if they believe they are being paid less?

Employees should first identify the precise difference.

Rather than simply asking whether another employee “earns more”, it is useful to establish:

  • what contractual term is different;
  • who the comparator is;
  • whether the comparator is of the opposite sex;
  • what work each person actually performs;
  • whether the jobs are the same, broadly similar or potentially of equal value; and
  • what explanation the employer gives for the difference.

 

Employees should retain payslips, contracts, job descriptions, bonus information, correspondence relating to pay and any information showing what work they and their comparator actually perform.

Where the roles are different, an equal value claim can become technically complex and may require expert evidence.

 

Can an employer simply say that it cannot afford to equalise pay?

The Next appeal also provides useful guidance on this point.

The relevant question is not simply whether the employer could afford to increase the pay of the lower-paid group.

The focus is on the reason why the comparator group receives the higher rate and whether reliance on that reason is legally justified.

In Next, the fact that the company might have been able to afford higher retail wages did not by itself defeat its defence. The relevant issue was whether there was a genuine business need to pay the higher warehouse rate.

This does not mean that cost is irrelevant in every equal pay case. Rather, affordability should not be confused with the underlying reason for the difference in treatment.

 

Does the Next decision mean that “market forces” will always justify different pay?

No. The decision does not create a general rule that market forces automatically justify paying one group more than another.

A bare assertion that one job “normally pays more” may itself reproduce historic inequalities in the labour market.

What mattered in Next was that there were specific recruitment and retention reasons for paying the warehouse employees more, supported by the factual findings in the case.

Employers relying on market forces should therefore be prepared to show what market pressure existed, how it affected the particular role and why the resulting difference in pay was reasonably necessary.

 

How can we help?

Our Litigation team advises both employers and employees on equal pay and workplace discrimination issues.

For employers, we can assist with reviewing salary and benefit structures, identifying potential equal pay risks, considering whether existing pay differentials can be justified, reviewing employment contracts and policies, and responding to grievances or Employment Tribunal claims.

For employees, we can advise on whether a difference in salary, bonus, overtime, allowances or other contractual benefits may amount to an equal pay issue, identify an appropriate comparator and advise on the evidence and procedure required to pursue a claim.

Obtaining advice at an early stage can often help identify whether there is a genuine legal issue and, where appropriate, allow the parties to address the position before a dispute develops into lengthy and expensive litigation.

 

Final thoughts

The lesson from the Next equal pay appeal decision is not that employers must always pay every employee performing work of equal value exactly the same amount.

Nor is it that an employer can simply refer to “market forces” and avoid the equal pay provisions.

The more useful lesson is this: where there is a difference in pay, employers should know why that difference exists and be able to prove it.

For employees, different job titles or different departments should not automatically prevent further enquiry. Equal pay law looks beyond labels and examines the real value and demands of the work being performed.

Clear pay structures, proper record keeping and regular review can prevent relatively ordinary salary differences from developing into major equal pay litigation.

 

Need legal advice? We’re here to help.

If you have questions about your situation or need advice on your next steps, our experienced legal team can help.

Call us on 020 7928 0276 between 9:30am and 6:00pm, or email [email protected].

You can also contact us online by completing our short enquiry form. Tell us a little about your situation and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible.

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James Cook

When a marriage ends, one spouse sometimes turns out to have far less on paper than the other expected. The business is worthless. The house belongs to someone else. There is barely anything to split.

Two Family Court decisions this year, MK v SK [2026] EWFC 28 and DR v ES [2026] EWFC 15, deal with exactly that scenario, and both involved husbands who said they had almost nothing when the surrounding evidence pointed the other way.

In each case, the court looked past the paperwork to work out who really held the money. And in each case, the husband came out of it worse than he would have done had he simply been open from the start.

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Written by Yi Ling Lio, Private Client Paralegal

 

Do you have to disclose everything in a divorce?

Yes. Anyone in financial remedy proceedings owes the court a duty of full and frank disclosure. The court cannot divide finances fairly if it cannot see them properly in the first place.

Where disclosure is patchy or unreliable, the court can draw adverse inferences. Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 confirms that a judge can work from the evidence that does exist, applying common sense and the probabilities of the case. Leaving gaps in the evidence does not mean the court has to ignore them.

The principle runs back to F v F [1994] 1 FLR 359. Where someone’s concealment makes the true position impossible to establish, the court would rather risk an outcome that disadvantages the person who withheld information than one that disadvantages the person who complied.

The problem tends not to stay contained. Once a judge decides a party has not been straight about one thing, everything else that party says becomes harder to believe. Credibility can matter as much as the assets themselves.

 

MK v SK: the husband who said he had almost nothing

The parties had been married for around 19 years. The husband had sold an internet start-up for more than $10 million, then co-founded a technology group and ran it as chief executive for over two decades. During the marriage the family used homes in London, the English countryside, Toronto, New York, Singapore and the Caribbean, all paid for through the business. The judge estimated the lifestyle might have cost as much as $1 million a year.

The husband’s case was that he had virtually no personal wealth. His account was that he had worked 80-hour weeks for twenty years without salary or bonuses, lived off business expenses, and gradually drawn down a $10 million loan he had made to the company. His shares sat in an offshore trust he said he could not control, and the business was close to insolvency in any event.

Mr Justice Peel did not accept his account, and two fairly small pieces of evidence weighed heavily against him.

The first was a photograph the wife took of a whiteboard after they separated. It set out the structure of the business and the trust, with “UBO” (Ultimate Beneficial Owner) written above the husband’s name. The judge decided the husband had either written those words or directed that they be written, and took the diagram as an accurate picture of the real position.

The second was an email in which the husband referred to the trust’s protector as the administrator of “my family trust”. That was hard to square with his claim that the trust was nothing to do with him.

The trust structure did not put the assets out of reach either. The question was not who technically owned them but whether, in practice, they were available to him, following Whaley v Whaley [2011] EWCA Civ 617. In evidence the husband accepted the trustee would do whatever he asked, which largely ended the argument that the money was beyond his reach. The trustees made matters worse: they repeatedly gave the husband’s solicitors the same unhelpful reply, then ignored the formal letters of request the court sent.

The court did not simply adopt the wife’s figures, however. Mr Justice Peel accepted the business was in genuine difficulty and put the husband’s wealth in the low millions, well below what the wife had claimed. The court used the adverse findings to make sense of the evidence it did have, not as an excuse to speculate.

The wife retained the mortgage-free former matrimonial home, worth approximately £837,500, and received £525,000 to clear debts, many of them run up during the litigation, plus a further £1.55 million as capitalised income. The judge dealt with the husband’s needs briefly. He retained access to undisclosed wealth, and if the outcome was less favourable than he wanted, that was down to how he had presented his finances. By the end of the proceedings, the parties’ combined legal costs exceeded £850,000.

 

DR v ES: the husband whose assets belonged to his parents, or so he said

DR v ES and others (Further LSPO Application) shows the same approach at an earlier stage, and what the court can do when one spouse is left unable to fund the litigation.

The parties married in 2008 and separated in early 2021. Much of the family’s wealth sat in two property companies. When the wife issued her financial remedy application, the husband disclosed in his Form E, for the first time, that he had never owned his share in one of the companies outright. He claimed he held it on trust for himself and his parents in equal shares, then sold his interest back to his parents for around £1.3 million, which on his account left them as the only beneficial owners.

That argument failed at a preliminary issue hearing. In DR v ES & Ors [2024] EWFC 176, Mr Justice Francis found that the husband owned the entire beneficial interest and that his parents had “closed ranks” with him to defeat or reduce the wife’s claims. The husband and his parents were ordered to pay the costs of the hearing, and permission to appeal was refused.

On the unchallenged expert evidence, the husband’s net assets came to around £18 million. The wife’s liabilities exceeded her assets.

That gap led to the January 2026 judgment. The wife applied for legal funding under section 22ZA of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which lets the court order one party to help fund the other’s costs where that is needed for a fair hearing. Where the paying party has been unclear about their finances, the court will not treat that uncertainty as a reason to refuse funding. It can proceed on the basis that they are able to pay, so their incomplete disclosure counts against them rather than helping them.

The wife sought just over £726,000, her fourth funding application. The husband accepted she needed the money but said he could not raise it in time, mentioning only on the morning of the hearing that he intended to meet his bank.

Mr Justice MacDonald was not convinced. A man worth around £18 million had complied with every previous funding order, and there was no good reason he could not manage this one. The judge ordered him to pay £560,120, part of it covering costs the wife had already run up. Her solicitors could not be expected to carry on with large bills unpaid, especially when the husband was planning to use borrowed money to clear his own lawyers first.

The order came with strict safeguards. Payment was by instalments, applied in a prescribed order, and the husband was barred from paying his own solicitors ahead of, or more than, the wife’s. The point was equality of arms: one party should not litigate with fully funded representation while the other struggles to keep a legal team instructed. The husband was also warned that further obstruction by him or his parents could lead the court to revisit the funding arrangements.

By that stage the financial remedy proceedings alone had cost around £2 million, with another £1.5 million spent on litigation about the children and £800,000 incurred by the parents themselves. Mr Justice MacDonald described the litigation as financially devastating for the family.

 

What the two cases have in common

In MK v SK the husband relied on an offshore trust. In DR v ES he said the assets belonged to his parents. However, in neither case did the court take the legal structure at face value. It asked who actually controlled the assets and whether the explanation held together against the rest of the evidence. Where it did not, the uncertainty was resolved against the party who created it.

The damage is not confined to the figures. Once a judge doubts one part of a party’s evidence, the rest becomes harder to accept. And neither dispute was cheap. Between them the families spent several million pounds, much of it linked by the judges to the way the litigation had been run. Trying to hide or reduce wealth made both cases more expensive, not less.

 

What can I do if I think my spouse is hiding assets?

A large gap between the disclosed finances and the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage is often the starting point. If the figures on paper could not have paid for the life you shared, the court will want that explained.

Gather what evidence you can. Records showing how household expenses were met, who provided financial support, and any documents referring to trusts, companies or informal family arrangements may all become relevant.

Complex structures should not put you off. Offshore trusts, corporate vehicles and family ownership arrangements do not by themselves defeat a financial claim. The court looks at practical reality as well as legal form, including who can access or control the assets.

A shortage of funds need not stop a case either. As DR v ES shows, the court can require one spouse to fund the other’s legal costs so that both can participate on an equal footing.

The court will not, however, speculate about hidden wealth without evidence, and genuine falls in asset values will be taken into account. The aim is not to punish anyone but to reach a fair outcome on the true financial position.

 

Key takeaways

  • Full and frank financial disclosure is a duty owed to the court. Where it is breached, the court can draw adverse inferences from the evidence that is available.
  • A substantial mismatch between the disclosed finances and the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage will attract close scrutiny.
  • Trusts, companies and family ownership arrangements do not automatically place assets beyond the court’s reach. Access and control matter more than labels.
  • The court can order one spouse to fund the other’s legal costs where necessary for both parties to participate fairly.
  • Poor disclosure rarely works as a strategy. It increases costs, undermines credibility and invites conclusions that full disclosure might have avoided.

 

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James Cook

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