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News and Insights

In late June 2025, the Administrative Court refused a care provider’s renewed application for judicial review following its skilled worker sponsor licence revocation by the Home Office. The central issue was whether the Secretary of State acted lawfully in revoking the licence based on insufficient evidence to prove that the roles sponsored were genuine.

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Background

On 20 March 2024, the Home Office suspended HE Reigns Healthcare Services Ltd’s sponsor licence, citing serious concerns that the organisation posed a threat to immigration control. Specifically, the Secretary of State expressed that the provider had assigned, or intended to assign, Certificates of Sponsorship (CoS) at a scale disproportionate to its business profile and that the sponsored roles were not genuine vacancies.

The provider was invited to submit evidence to verify the legitimacy of the sponsored roles, including staff lists, justification for recruitment levels, and evidence that sponsored workers were carrying out the duties listed in their CoS. The response from the provider disputed the allegations and highlighted a newly secured contract to justify its recruitment needs, though the precise scope and sufficiency of the evidence submitted remained unclear.

On 12 June 2024, the licence was formally revoked. The Secretary of State noted, among other issues, that 50 of the 124 sponsored workers could not be identified on payroll records, and that the volume of contracted work did not support the level of recruitment.

 

Judicial Review Claim

HE Reigns brought a judicial review claim, asserting procedural unfairness and contesting the conclusions drawn by the Home Office. Key arguments included:

  • The revocation process lacked transparency and fairness;
  • The evidence showed sufficient work to justify the sponsored roles;
  • A finding of deliberate dishonesty was required for revocation;
  • Inadequate consideration was given to contracts and the workers’ actual status;
  • The 20MB limit for uploading evidence was unreasonable;
  • There was insufficient engagement with their representations.

 

The Secretary of State responded that:

  • There were reasonable grounds to suspect non-genuine vacancies, which justified revocation;
  • The evidence submitted was inadequate;
  • There is no requirement to prove dishonesty to revoke a licence;
  • Their approach to the evidence and procedural limits complied with public law standards.

 

The Court’s Decision

The Court ruled against HE Reigns Healthcare. It found:

  • The Secretary of State is not required to prove deceit or dishonesty to revoke a licence where non-genuine vacancies are suspected;
  • The claim that 50 workers were unaccounted for was supported by the evidence, given the lack of payroll records or explanation;
  • There was no obligation on the Secretary of State to conduct interviews or go beyond the representations made by the provider;
  • No public law error occurred in the handling of the case or the format in which evidence was accepted.

 

The Court ultimately refused permission for the claim to proceed.

 

Conclusion

While this case does not create new law, it serves as a critical reminder of the stringent compliance obligations placed on sponsor licence holders. From a UK immigration perspective, the case reinforces the importance of proactive and detailed record-keeping, particularly in demonstrating the genuineness of sponsored roles and ensuring complete and coherent responses to Home Office enquiries.

Employers should not wait for enforcement action to review their systems. Our team continues to assist sponsors in navigating their duties under the current immigration framework, especially in light of the upcoming rule changes to the Skilled Worker route from 22 July 2025.

If you are concerned about the strength of your compliance framework or have received correspondence from the Home Office, we recommend seeking legal advice at the earliest opportunity. Contact Lisa’s Law today to find out how we can help you.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call our office on 020 7928 0276, we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

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James Cook

Generally, settlement agreements are designed to resolve disputes and prevent further legal actions, including forfeiture, unless explicitly stated otherwise. If the landlord initiated forfeiture proceedings despite the existence of a prior settlement agreement that addresses the same issues, they may have acted inconsistently with the terms or intentions of that agreement.

In this appeal case, the court reaffirmed that settlement agreements should be interpreted according to their plain language and legal context.

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Background

This case involves a dispute over whether the Landlord Company could seek forfeiture of the Tenant’s lease of a flat, or whether a settlement agreement from December 2021 prevented such action. The Tenant occupied the flat under a lease from 1980 for a duration of 999 years. The lease includes covenants to keep the premises in repair and provisions for re-entry if breached. In 2020-2021, water leaks from the Tenant’s flat caused damage to the flat below. Investigations identified issues with the shower area, including faulty grouting and possible structural cracks.

The Landlord Company issued notices demanding repairs, but delays occurred. Notably, the Leasehold Reform Act 2002 and the 1938 Act restricts the ability of landlords to serve notices or pursue forfeiture for breaches related to repairs, especially if breaches are disputed or settled. After the Landlord Company filed three applications in the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) alleging breach of repairing covenants, the parties reached settlement in December 2021 which included the Tenant admitting breach, paying £75,000, and covenants not to sue or pursue claims related to the dispute.

Legal Issue

The core issue on appeal is whether the Landlord Company was barred from seeking forfeiture due to the settlement agreement, or whether the agreement effectively prevented it from continuing proceedings. The appeal also concerns the costs awarded.

The Court found that the agreement released the Tenant from claims related to the proceedings and prohibited either party from suing the other regarding the same. However, there is debate over whether this release includes or excludes forfeiture proceedings.

The lower court’s decision was that the settlement did not prevent forfeiture proceedings, but the Judge granted the Tenant relief on costs.

The Tenant appeals, primarily challenging the costs order, with the legal question cantered on whether the settlement agreement barred the Landlord Company from seeking forfeiture and related proceedings.

Decision

The Judge emphasised that the Tenant’s admission of breach under clause 4 of the settlement agreement was crucial in favour of the Landlord. However, the analysis of section 168 revealed that its primary purpose is to determine whether a breach has occurred, serving as a step towards potential forfeiture but not constituting a forfeiture itself. The case highlighted that remedies like injunctions or damages remain available alongside or instead of forfeiture, and that a breach determination under section 168(4) does not automatically lead to forfeiture, especially if the breach has been remedied or if the right to forfeit has been waived.

The Court also clarified that in this case, the benefits gained from the section 168 application—such as additional obligations and deadlines—were significant and cannot be dismissed as insubstantial. Furthermore, the parties’ legal context suggested that forfeiture was unlikely due to protections under the Leasehold Property (Repairs) Act 1938, which makes forfeiture of long leases challenging.

The dispute centred on whether the breach of clauses 3(1) and 5.3 of the lease or the settlement agreement justified forfeiture. The Court concluded that the agreement reshaped the parties’ rights, discharging claims related to lease breaches and limiting future claims to breaches of the agreement itself. Consequently, the Landlord was not entitled to forfeit the lease based on breaches of clauses not incorporated into the lease obligations. The Tenant succeeded in contesting the cost for forfeiture claim by the Landlord.

Our thoughts

This case is a demonstration and reminder on the principle of settlement agreement, and it is crucial for disputed parties to clarify key provisions and to comply with them, when such an agreement is reached.

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

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James Cook

That’s what happened in DSD v MJW [2025] EWFC 119 (B) – a case that serves as a sharp warning for anyone thinking of applying for maintenance pending suit (MPS) during divorce.

The wife’s application, brought just months before trial, was rejected outright. The judge’s verdict? The claim was late, unnecessary, and financially irrational.

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What is MPS – and when should you use it?

MPS is a type of interim financial support available to one spouse during divorce proceedings, before a final settlement is reached. It’s there to help meet essential needs – food, housing, bills – when the applicant doesn’t have access to sufficient funds.

But it’s not designed for tactical use, and it’s not a guaranteed fallback. The court must be satisfied that:

 

  • There’s a clear and immediate need, and
  • The request is reasonable – in timing, amount, and cost.

 

What happened in this case?

The wife applied for £500 per month for a few months – at most, £2,000. But by the time of the hearing, she had spent £8,716 in legal costs on the application alone. The husband had spent over £4,700 defending it.

The court was unimpressed. The final hearing was already scheduled for July 2025, and the parties had around £700,000 in proceeds from a property sale held in solicitors’ accounts. The wife hadn’t proposed drawing from that money until just days before the hearing.

She also argued she might lose her accommodation – but offered no real evidence. The judge pointed out that, if a genuine housing emergency had arisen, the court could have listed a hearing at short notice.

 

Why was the application refused?

  1. Too late

The claim came months after the failed FDR (settlement hearing). By then, the court felt it was more appropriate to wait for the full trial, where the parties’ finances would be properly assessed.

 

  1. Not urgent

The wife had regular income from the armed forces and subsidised housing. There was no pressing need for immediate intervention.

 

  1. Cost outweighed benefit

Spending £9,000 in legal fees to pursue a claim worth £2,000 didn’t stack up. The judge described it as making “no commercial sense whatsoever.”

 

  1. Lack of engagement with alternatives

The judge questioned why the wife didn’t suggest releasing a modest sum from joint funds earlier – a solution that might have resolved the issue without going to court.

 

Was it strategic?

The court suspected the application may have been tactical – aimed at influencing later claims or increasing pressure on the husband. But that strategy backfired.

Judges are alert to this kind of approach. Interim claims that appear opportunistic or inflated often damage the applicant’s credibility and risk adverse costs orders.

 

What are the key lessons for divorcing spouses?

Make early, proportionate applications.

Courts are more likely to grant MPS when it’s made promptly, with clear evidence of need, and without excessive cost.

 

Explore alternatives before litigating.

Where joint funds exist, consider whether a practical solution can be agreed instead of going to court.

 

Don’t assume MPS is guaranteed.

Even if your financial position is tight, the court will weigh whether a temporary order is necessary and justified.

 

Avoid tactical moves.

Applications brought for pressure or positioning often result in wasted costs and strained proceedings.

 

Final thoughts

The Family Court’s message is clear: maintenance pending suit can offer real support where it’s genuinely needed –  but used poorly, it can waste time, money, and goodwill. Before making any application, it pays to ask not just can I?, but should I?

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

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James Cook

Many people believe that once they’ve lived in the UK for over 10 years, especially with EU citizenship, their immigration status is secure. But the reality is far more complex. The UK immigration system makes clear distinctions between legal status, length of residence, and criminal history—and any misstep can put even long-term residents at risk of deportation.

In this article, we look at the case of Mr Borges, a Portuguese national who had lived in the UK since childhood, but whose criminal convictions eventually led to his removal order being upheld by the Court of Appeal. His case raises important questions: does EU citizenship always protect you from deportation? Can long residence offset a serious criminal record? What exactly are the limits of protection under EU law?

If you have an EU background, a complicated immigration history, or past convictions, this case is worth your attention.

 

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Background of SSHD v Borges

Mr Borges, born in India in 1988, came to the UK in 2002 and received a permanent residence card in 2007. In 2008, at age 19, he was convicted of dangerous driving and handling stolen goods. In 2010, he was convicted again for driving offences. Just a year later, in 2011, he was sentenced to 21 months for two robberies, but successfully appealed a deportation decision in 2012. That same year, he received another warning letter. In 2014, he gave up his Indian passport and obtained a Portuguese one. On 3 June 2019, he was convicted of burglary, aggravated burglary, and drug possession, and sentenced to six years.

After his release in October 2022, his EU Settlement Scheme application was refused on suitability grounds, and the Secretary of State of the Home Department (SSHD) made a formal deportation order in November 2022.

Mr Borges appealed, arguing that under Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38, as an EU citizen who had resided continuously in the UK for 10 years, he qualified for the highest level of protection against removal. The First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) allowed his appeal. The SSHD appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT), which refused permission to appeal in 2024. The SSHD then applied to the Court of Appeal (the Court).

 

Legal Issues & Court Analysis

The SSHD’s appeal was based on two grounds:  firstly, the UT erred in holding that Mr Borges enjoyed the highest level of protection against removal based on his residence during his time as a non-EU national toward the 10-year threshold. Furthermore, even if Mr Borges qualified for such protection,  there were imperative grounds of public security to justify removal.

The Court of Appeal, with permission from the Lord Justice, allowed the appeal and analysed two grounds and made the submissions and decisions as below.

 

Ground One

On Ground one, whether Mr Borges enjoys the eligibility for enhanced protection, the Court held that Regulation 27(4), interpreted in light of the EU Directive, requires a person to have held EU citizenship throughout the 10-year residence period, not merely as a family member of one. The distinction between primary rights (EU citizens) and derivative rights (non-EU family members) is fundamental, as Article 28(3) must be read in light of related provisions and case law, which emphasize that derivative rights (as family members) differ fundamentally from primary rights of EU citizens. Borges did not become an EU citizen until 2014, which was only shortly before his removal decision, and his earlier residence was as a non-EU family member.

Furthermore, time spent in prison interrupts continuous residence unless strong integrative links are shown, which were not established in this case. Therefore, Borges was not entitled to the highest level of protection. The Court sided with the SSHD on ground one.

 

Ground Two

On ground 2, whether the tribunals errored in public security assessment, the Court also found that, The F-tT erred in law by not clearly determining whether Borges was entitled to enhanced protection before applying the “imperative grounds” test.

It further erred in assuming jurisdiction to re-assess whether such grounds existed without first identifying a legal error in the SSHD’s decision. The UT compounded this error by making its own evaluation without first setting aside the F-tT’s decision. Therefore, the UT exceeded its jurisdiction. Further, the court held that the tribunal failed to fully engage with Borges’s criminal history, repeated offending, and limited evidence of rehabilitation.

Although Mr Borges had lived in the UK for over two decades and held an EU passport, the court ultimately ruled that he was not entitled to the highest level of protection under EU law. Because he only became an EU citizen partway through his time in the UK, and had multiple criminal convictions with time spent in prison, he was found not to meet the requirement of 10 years’ continuous residence as an EU citizen. The court also agreed that his pattern of offending posed a genuine threat to public security. The Court allowed the SSHD’s appeal on  both grounds and the case was remitted for proper reconsideration.

 

Our comments

Mr Borges’s case is a reminder that immigration status isn’t a guarantee—especially when serious criminal records are involved. It’s not just about how long you’ve lived in the UK, but whether your stay has been legal and whether you’ve followed the rules.

When applying for settlement, the Home Office will always look at the applicant’s character and whether the presence is in the public interest. This means that even if you’ve been in the UK for many years, hold settled status, or have EU citizenship, a criminal record can still put you at risk of removal.

If you have previous convictions or a complex immigration history, seeking legal advice early is essential as it allows you to clearly understand your legal position, assess potential risks, and avoid serious consequences.

If you have the above concerns, please do not hesitate to contact Lisa’s Law. Our professional and experienced legal team would be happy to support you with clear, practical advice tailored to your needs.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

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James Cook

In a landmark ruling handed down today, the UK Supreme Court has clarified one of the most contested areas in financial remedy law: when can non matrimonial assets be shared after divorce?

The case of Standish v Standish concerned a wealthy couple whose marriage broke down in 2020. At the heart of the dispute was an £80 million transfer from husband to wife during the marriage. The wife claimed this gift had become matrimonial property and should be split equally under the “sharing principle.” The husband argued it was never meant to be shared, and had been transferred for tax planning purposes only.

Today, the UK’s highest court sided with the husband, and in doing so, set a new, definitive standard for how non-matrimonial property is treated in high-value divorces.

 

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What was the dispute?

The husband, a retired investment banker, had amassed significant wealth long before his second marriage. In 2017, concerned about future inheritance tax liabilities, he transferred £77 million to his wife’s sole name. The couple discussed placing the funds into offshore trusts for their children, but the trusts were never set up. The money remained with the wife.

When they later divorced, the wife argued that by transferring those funds during the marriage, the husband had “matrimonialised” them – in other words, turned them into shared assets. The High Court agreed and awarded her £45 million. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, and the wife appealed to the Supreme Court. We previously covered this Court of Appeal case last year.

 

What did the Supreme Court decide?

The key question was whether the £80 million had become matrimonial property subject to the sharing principle.

The Court answered no, and went further, affirming that:

“The sharing principle does not apply to non-matrimonial property.”

Unless an asset was acquired as part of the marital partnership, or unless both parties treated it as shared over time, it falls outside the sharing principle.

In this case, the husband’s transfer was part of a tax-saving scheme, intended to benefit their children, not the wife. There was no evidence that either party had treated the £80 million as part of the shared marital estate.

 

Why does this matter?

This marks a significant moment in the development of modern family law. Until now, the lower courts had left room for argument that non-matrimonial assets — such as inheritances or pre-marital wealth — might be shared in exceptional cases.

The Supreme Court has now drawn a clear line:

  • Matrimonial property, earned or generated during the marriage, is subject to sharing.
  • Non-matrimonial property, pre-marital wealth, gifts, or inheritance is not, unless the parties clearly treated it as shared over time.

This significantly narrows the scope for a spouse to claim against separate property in divorce proceedings.

 

What is “matrimonialisation”?

The concept of matrimonialisation — turning separate property into shared marital property — still exists, but the Court made clear it must be based on substance, not form.

The test is:

Did the parties treat the asset as shared over time, not just in title, but in intention and use?

A bare transfer of title, as in this case, is insufficient on its own. There must be clear evidence that both parties considered the asset part of the marital pot.

In Standish, the £80 million remained separate in substance and intention. No trust was ever set up, and the transfer was tax-driven, not an expression of shared intent.

 

What about fairness?

While the wife in Standish initially received £45 million, the Court of Appeal reduced her award to £25 million. This was based on a narrower definition of matrimonial property. The Supreme Court upheld that outcome.

However, the justices reaffirmed that the courts still retain tools under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Where one spouse has unmet financial needs, or has given up career opportunities, the court may make provision through the needs or compensation principles. But the sharing principle must be reserved for property generated through the joint efforts of the marriage.

 

Key takeaways

This decision reshapes the landscape for financial remedy cases, particularly where significant pre-marital or inherited wealth is involved. Here’s what separating spouses and their advisers need to know:

 

1. Matrimonial property is for sharing.

If it was built up during the marriage, it will usually be divided equally.

 

2. Non-matrimonial property is not automatically in the pot.

Assets brought into the marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance generally remain separate, unless clearly treated as shared over time.

 

3. Transfers between spouses do not automatically convert property.

A tax-motivated gift will remain separate in law unless there is a mutual intention to treat it as jointly owned.

 

4. Fairness and financial need remain central to the court’s discretion.

A financially weaker spouse may still have a claim, but not through the sharing principle alone.

This case may mark the end of any remaining ambiguity about what qualifies as matrimonial property in English law. Going forward, separating spouses should have a sharper understanding of what is (and isn’t) up for division. The line between joint and separate property is now clearer — and that clarity must inform both negotiation and expectation.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

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James Cook

Today, the Home Office published a new Statement of Changes HC 997 to the Immigration Rules with significant developments that merit urgent attention. Keep reading to find out more about the latest immigration rules update.

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Closure of Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy

Effective from 3:00 p.m. today, the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) has been closed with immediate effect, without any explanation or transitional arrangements. This abrupt closure may have serious implications for those seeking protection or relocation under the scheme.

Substantial Changes to the Skilled Worker Route Effective 22 July 2025

The Statement of Changes also sets out major amendments to the Skilled Worker route, which will take effect from 22 July 2025. Any applications submitted before this date will continue to be assessed under the current rules.

We have summarised the key upcoming changes to the Skilled Worker route below:

  1. Increase in Skill and Salary Thresholds

As anticipated in the immigration white paper published in May 2025, the skills threshold will revert to RQF Level 6. The Home Office’s explanatory memorandum indicates that approximately 180 roles will no longer qualify for sponsorship. However, today’s official press release contradicts this, suggesting that 111 occupations will be removed from the list of eligible roles.

While transitional arrangements will be available for those already in roles below RQF Level 6, the Home Office has confirmed that such provisions are temporary and “will be reviewed in due course.”

In addition, salary thresholds will apply to the Skilled Worker, Global Business Mobility and Scale-up routes.

For instance, the minimum salary threshold for the Skilled Worker route will rise from £38,700 to £41,700 per annum. For new entrants, the minimum salary will increase from £30,960 to £33,400.

Notably, no transitional arrangements will be offered for these salary increases. Individuals already on these routes must meet the new thresholds at the time of their next application.

  1. Expansion of the Immigration Salary List & Introduction of a Temporary Shortage List

Two shortage occupation lists will be introduced, based on reviews of the Migration Advisory Committee, the Department for Business and Trade, and HM Treasury:

  • Expanded Immigration Salary List; and
  • Temporary Shortage List, targeting occupations critical to the UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy (to be phased out by the end of 2026 or sooner).

Importantly, new applicants under these lists will not be permitted to bring dependants, though those already on the Skilled Worker route will retain this right.

  1. Care Worker Route Closed to Overseas Applicants

From 22 July 2025, care workers and senior care workers (SOC codes 6135 and 6136) will no longer be eligible to apply for entry clearance from abroad. Sponsors must instead focus on recruiting individuals already in the UK under the Skilled Worker route.

However, a transitional period until 22 July 2028 will apply to in-country applications made by those who are already employed by a licensed healthcare sponsor.

  1. Expected Future Changes

The Home Office has also confirmed that the following changes will be introduced before the end of 2025:

  • Changes to the Immigration Skills Charge;
  • An increase in the English language threshold; and
  • A new “family policy framework”.

 

Further measures affecting asylum and border control are also expected to be announced later in the year.

Conclusion

This latest Statement of Changes comes just one week after a separate update to the Immigration Rules, underscoring the pace and unpredictability of the current immigration policy landscape. The clear direction of travel suggests a continued focus on reducing net migration by significantly tightening the eligibility criteria for “lower-skilled” roles under the Skilled Worker route.

We strongly advise any prospective applicants or sponsors to seek legal advice and take timely action to submit applications before 22 July 2025, wherever possible, to benefit from the current rules.

If you have any questions regarding how these changes may affect you or your organisation, please do not hesitate to contact our team today.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

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James Cook

In UK litigation, a defendant can apply for an order requiring the claimant to provide security for costs — a financial guarantee to cover the defendant’s legal costs if the claim fails. This is especially relevant for international claimants, including those based in China.

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When Can Security for Costs Be Ordered?

A UK court may order security if:

  • The claimant is based outside the UK.
  • There are concerns the claimant cannot or will not pay the defendant’s costs if ordered.
  • The claimant appears to be avoiding enforcement (e.g. hiding assets).
  • The court finds it just and fair to do so.

 

How Much Security and How to Provide It

The amount depends on the estimated costs the defendant may recover. Security can be provided by:

  • Paying into court,
  • Providing a bank guarantee, or
  • An undertaking from a third party.

 

Failure to provide security may result in the claim being paused or struck out.

Advice for International Clients

  • Be prepared: Understand the potential for a security for costs application.
  • Demonstrate financial standing early, if needed.
  • Seek early legal advice to navigate UK court procedures confidently.

 

Conclusion

Security for costs is a common and powerful tool in UK litigation, especially in cases involving international claimants. Understanding how it works can help international businesses protect their position and plan effectively.

Our firm has extensive experience advising international, but particularly Chinese clients in UK legal disputes. If you would like to discuss how security for costs could affect your case, please contact our team for expert guidance.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

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James Cook

A suite of important immigration rule changes are set to take effect in July 2025 (Immigration Rules HC836) marking a significant shift across several key areas of the UK’s immigration framework.

The amendments highlight a more flexible residence test under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS), corrections to the Private Life route for children and young adults, a stricter approach to applicants excluded from international protection, recognition of time spent as a British citizen under long residence provisions, broader use of prior English language tests, and expanded Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) requirements.

In this article, we will break down the changes within the Immigration Rules HC836 in detail. Keep reading to find out how they could affect you.

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EUSS Continuous Residence Test (30 months in 60 months period)

Effective date: 16 July 2025

A significant change to the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) will ease the path to settled status for many applicants with pre-settled status which came into effect on 16 July 2025. Under the updated rules, individuals no longer need to demonstrate continuous residence in the UK since the end of the Brexit transition period (31 December 2020). Instead, they will be eligible for settled status if they can show 30 months of UK residence within the previous 60 months, regardless of whether that period includes lengthy absences.

This reform addresses a critical gap in the original scheme, which left many EEA nationals and their family members at risk of losing their route to permanent residence due to a lack of awareness about the strict “6 months in any 12 months” absence rule. The adjustment follows extensive legal advocacy and reflects the UK government’s compliance with the 2022 High Court decision in R (IMA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, which found parts of the EUSS unlawful.

In practical terms, this change benefits pre-settled status holders with extended absences, those eligible for the Home Office’s automated upgrade to settled status, and applicants who may have technically breached residence requirements under the previous rules but have maintained substantial ties to the UK. This marks a welcome step toward greater fairness and clarity in the post-Brexit immigration framework.

 

Private Life corrections for children 

Effective date: 29 July 2025

From 29 July 2025, the Immigration Rules will introduce a targeted but important correction to the Private Life route, specifically aimed at children and young adult who missed out on a previous concession offered by the Home Office. The new rule reinstates and formalises a narrow but crucial pathway for children and young adults who:

  • Could have benefitted from the Home Office’s earlier Private Life concession;
  • Did not apply under the Private Life route before 20 June 2022;
  • Instead received leave as a dependent under Appendix FM (family life) or even leave outside the Rules.

These individuals will not be required to show that they are currently on, or were last granted, leave under the Private Life route in order to apply for settlement. Instead, they will be assessed based on their 5-year continuous legal residence history.

Secondly, a more specific additional continuous residence rules at PL 15.1 have been introduced for children born in the UK, who have been living in the UK continuously for seven years.

 

Private life route for children Eligibility before:

Child born in the UK After seven years continuous residence (with or without legal permission) can apply for immediate settlement with their UK birth Certificate and relevant documents, proving that it is not reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK IMMEDIATE
Child or young adult born outside the UK Child not born in the UK with seven years residence or young adult with ‘half-life’ in the UK, need to have leave on Private life first, then can apply for settlement after they are on the Private life route for 5 years FIVE YEARS AFTER ON QUALIFYING ROUTE

 

Private life route for children Eligibility after 29 July 2025:

 

Child born in the UK After meet the continuous seven years residence requirement at PL 15.1 (see below) (with or without legal permission) can apply for immediate settlement with their UK birth Certificate and relevant documents, proving that it is not reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK. IMMEDIATE
Child or young adult born outside the UK Child not born in the UK with seven years continuous residence or young adult with ‘half-life’ in the UK, can apply for settlement after they are on Private route/Family life route/ leave outside the Rules route for 5 years. FIVE YEARS AFTER ON QUALIFYING ROUTE

 

Relevant rules:

“For PL 15.1. (including the title before PL 15.1), substitute:

“Continuous Residence requirement for settlement on the Private Life route

 PL 15.1. The applicant must meet the continuous residence requirements as set out in Appendix Continuous Residence for the qualifying period for settlement, unless they are a child born in the UK.

Continuous residence requirements for a child born in the UK applying for settlement on the Private Life route

PL 15A.1. The period of continuous residence at PL 13.2. may include time spent in the UK with or without permission.

PL 15A.2. The period of continuous residence at PL 13.2. does not include any period during which the applicant was serving a sentence of imprisonment or was detained in an institution other than a prison.

PL 15A.3. The period of continuous residence at PL 13.2. is broken (i.e. is no longer continuous) if any of the following apply:

(a) the applicant has been absent from the UK for more than 6 months at any one time; or

(b) the applicant has spent a total of 550 days or more absent from the UK during the period of continuous residence at PL 13.2.; or

(c) the applicant has been removed, deported or has left the UK having had an application for permission to enter or stay in the UK refused; or

(d) the applicant left the UK with no reasonable expectation at the time of leaving that they would lawfully be able to return.” .”

 

Restricted leave for certain excluded individuals

Effective date: 16 July 2025

A significant and consequential change has taken effect under Part 9 of the Immigration Rules. Under the new provisions, it will now be mandatory, rather than discretionary, for the Home Office to refuse an application for Entry clearance, Permission to enter and Permission to stay in cases involving individuals excluded from international protection on specific serious criminal or harmful conduct grounds. These changes apply to individuals who have either already been excluded under Part 11, specifically paragraph 339AA, 339AC, 339D or 339GB or individuals who would be excluded under those provisions had they submitted a protection claim.

If an individual falls within these exclusion categories, their application for entry clearance, permission to enter, or permission to stay must be refused. Similarly, any existing permission must be cancelled. In such cases, the only form of leave available is restricted leave—a temporary and limited form of immigration status that does not lead to settlement or British citizenship. Such leave is typically granted in narrow circumstance to comply with internation legal obligation, and may be subject to strict reporting and monitoring requirements.

Relevant rules:

“Exclusion from the Refugee Convention

339AA. This paragraph applies where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person should have been, or is, excluded from being a refugee in accordance with Article 1D and 1E of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, as defined in section 36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Danger to the United Kingdom

339AC. This paragraph applies where the Secretary of State is satisfied that: Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention applies in that:

(i) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the United Kingdom; or

(ii) having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, the person constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom (see section 72 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).

Exclusion from humanitarian protection

339D. An asylum applicant is excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection for the purposes of paragraph 339C(iv) where the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are serious reasons for considering that the asylum applicant:

(i) has committed, instigated or otherwise participated in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; or

(ii) has committed, instigated or otherwise participated in the commission of a serious non-political crime outside the UK prior to their admission to the UK as a person granted humanitarian protection; or

(iii) has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; or

(iv) having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime (as defined in Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), constitutes a danger to the community of the UK; or

(v) is a danger to the security of the UK.

Revocation of humanitarian protection on the grounds of exclusion

339GB. This paragraph applies where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person granted humanitarian protection should have been or is excluded from humanitarian protection under paragraph 339D of these rules.”

 

Long residence for British Citizenship

Effective date: 29 July 2025

From 29 July 2025, Appendix Long Residence will be amended to allow individuals to count time spent in the UK as a British citizen towards the 10-year lawful residence requirement under paragraphs 3.1 and 11.1.

This change recognises that some individuals may have held British citizenship for part of their residence period and subsequently lost it—either voluntarily or through official deprivation. However, an important distinction is drawn. That the time spent as a British citizen will ONLY count towards long residence if the person voluntarily renounced their citizenship but not where they have been the subject of a deprivation process.

A new guidance on Declaration of renunciation that is published in May noted that if one voluntarily renounces their British citizenship and want to live in the UK. If they are living in the UK, they can apply for settlement at the same time as they apply to give up their citizenship. The settlement application will be decided after the renunciation has been processed.

Reuse of English Test across different routes

Effective date: 16 July 2025

Applicants now will be permitted to reuse an English language test certificate that was previously accepted as part of a successful immigration application, regardless of the route under which it was originally submitted.

This amendment brings the Immigration Rules in line with existing caseworker guidance, ensuring consistency and reducing unnecessary duplication. As long as the certificate was accepted by the Home Office in a prior successful application, it can now be relied upon in subsequent applications—even if the applicant is switching to a different visa route.

Expanded ETA requirement

Effective date: 15 July 2025

An important clarification for individuals crossing the UK-Ireland border has taken into effect on 15 July 2025. The Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) validity requirements are being amended to formally include a specific category of travellers previously omitted from the Immigration Rules. Under the updated Rules, an ETA will be explicitly required for relevant nationals who:

  • Enter the UK from the Republic of Ireland,
  • Having arrived in Ireland from outside the Common Travel Area (CTA), or
  • Having previously held limited leave to enter or remain in the UK that has since expired unless they are classified as an S2 Healthcare Visitor.

Final comments

This concludes our explanation about the latest changes to the immigration rules, Immigration Rules HC836. Contact us today for help with any of our immigration legal services you may require, or subscribe to our newsletter for further updates.

Have questions? Get in touch today!

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author avatar
James Cook

While one might typically expect the most contentious financial issues in a divorce to involve the family home or a business, the case of FI v DO [2024] EWFC 384 instead centred on the ownership of a golden retriever puppy and who gets the dog in a divorce. To many people, pets are like family members, something which goes beyond the traditional legal classification of pets as “chattel”.

Judgment was handed down for this case on 20 December 2024.Let’s examine the case and who gets to keep the dog in a divorce in more detail.

Namecard for article - Samson in English

Background

The couple filed for divorce in October 2022 and have two children who were born in 2011 and 2017 respectively. A conditional order was pronounced in May 2023, and the parties confirmed they had not lived together since. The children and the dog remained with the wife and had no contact with the husband. Both the husband and the wife claimed ownership of the dog.

 

Disputed Issues

 

  1. Who Paid for the Dog?

The husband claimed that he purchased the dog in cash and that the wife made no financial contribution. The wife, however, asserted that it was a joint family purchase. She is the registered keeper and has paid for all ongoing expenses, including veterinary care and insurance.

 

Under English law, pets are considered as chattels (i.e., tangible, movable property), similar to items such as jewellery or furniture. Therefore, courts do not focus on who purchased the pet, but rather the fair division of property based on the circumstances. Despite its irrelevance, District Judge Crisp found the wife’s evidence more credible, noting her status as the registered keeper and highlighting the inconsistencies in the husband’s legal correspondence.

 

  1. Whether the Dog was a Disability Support Animal

 

The husband argued that he had trained and registered the dog as a support animal to assist with his mental health. He submitted a letter from his medical practitioner to support his claim. The wife disputed this, stating the dog had never been registered as a support animal.

The court found that the registration occurred only in February 2024 — after the parties had separated. Furthermore, earlier legal documents made no mention of the dog’s support role. The judge concluded that the registration was likely made to strengthen the husband’s legal position.

 

  1. The Incident on 12th December

 

The husband claimed he encountered the dog running loose in the community and took it home, where it willingly accompanied him. The husband was later arrested, and the dog was returned to the wife.

The wife’s account differed significantly. She stated that the husband forcibly took the dog from her mother, who had been walking it. The dog ran off because of the husband and that he was chasing it. The wife had a recording of the husband dragging the dog into his car from the family home where the dog had run back to. The dog was later returned with injuries to its paws after being dragged away by the husband.

The court found the wife’s evidence compelling during cross-examination and did not accept the husband’s version that the dog willingly accompanied him.

Judgment

District Judge Crisp referred to the legal authority in RK v RK [2011] EWHC 3901 as to who has principally looked after the dog. He also emphasised the question is not who purchased the dog, but who the dog sees as their carer and who is currently taking care of the dog. The judge noted:

  • The wife had cared for the dog exclusively for 18 months after the couple’s separation
  • The judge agreed with the wife that 18 months is a significant period in a dog’s life
  • The dog ran back to the family home after the December incident, suggesting it viewed that as its safe space
  • The husband had managed without the dog for 18 months, undermining his claim of necessity

 

The judge concluded that the wife had consistently prioritised the dog’s welfare and should retain ownership.

Our thoughts

The case is notable given the limited precedent on pet ownership in divorce proceedings, despite the prevalence of family pets. While pets are traditionally treated as chattels under English law, the judgment in FI v DO suggests a shift toward considering the welfare and emotional bonds of the animal. District Judge Crisp’s approach introduces a more nuanced framework, where the pet’s best interests may influence the outcome.

However, until higher courts adopt a similar stance, legal uncertainty remains. Outcomes may vary depending on the specific facts of the case — including the type of pet (e.g., dogs versus cats), its value, and the nature of the relationship with each party. Nonetheless, this decision may serve as a useful reference point for future cases involving pet ownership in divorce proceedings.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

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author avatar
James Cook

During their immigration application, many clients are concerned about a sensitive but realistic question: “If I have prior criminal records, will it impact my application? If I was forced to participate in a crime, would it still be possible to reverse the case?” Such situations are not infrequent in practice, especially in cases involving drugs and illegal labour.  The victim of modern slavery or human trafficking is a common defence for affected individuals to mitigate unfavourable decisions.

The case we’re discussing today, R v BMJ , is about applications for leave to appeal against convictions for multiple drug-related and associated offences as well as sentences imposed across three distinct sets of offences. The applicant sought to mitigate his criminal liability and avoid adverse immigration consequences by attempting to plead a victim of modern slavery or trafficking . While the defence was unsuccessful in this instance, it provides a valuable lesson for similar cases in the future.

Namecard for article - Yang in English (2)

Background of R v BMJ

 

The applicant has a criminal record involving multiple offences and was sentenced to imprisonment for his convictions, including possession with intent to supply Class A drugs, possession of criminal property, carrying a bladed article, failing to surrender to custody, drug supply offences, and driving offences.

In November 2022, the Single Competent Authority (SCA) issued a conclusive grounds decision recognising him as a “victim of modern slavery in the UK during approximately 2007/2008 – April 2021 for the specific purpose of criminal exploitation” The applicant has since applied for an extension of time in which to appeal against convictions and sentences, submitting fresh evidence linked to his trafficking victim status. The applicant argues that this new context undermines prior findings and justifies revisiting the original decisions.

The Court fully considered the relevant sentencing guidelines, prior defence materials, and new evidence, and concluded as follows:

Regarding the appeal against sentence, the applicant argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that insufficient weight had been given to mitigating factors related to drug trafficking and debt. However, the Court found that the applicant did not credibly demonstrate that he was a victim of modern slavery or trafficking in connection with the offences at that time.

Appropriate reductions within the sentencing range had already been made, taking into account both the applicant’s prior convictions and the seriousness of the offences, rendering the sentence fair and proportionate.

The Court ruled out any abuse of process and found no other grounds that could affect the safety of the convictions; therefore, the application’s grounds were unarguable, and his applicant was refused.

 

Our thoughts

 

Authorities consider the conviction based on the following factors: 1) whether there is reason to believe that the individual is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking? 2) whether there is clear evidence of a credible common law defence of duress? 3) whether there is clear evidence of a statutory defence 4) whether it is in the public interest to prosecute the individual?

It is notable that, although the applicant was later referred through the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) process and ultimately recognised as a victim by the SCA, the Court did not rely solely on this finding. Instead, it examined the case as a whole.

Given the applicant’s inconsistent statements and lack of credibility, alongside prosecution evidence showing the applicant played an active role in drug distribution, the Court concluded that—while the applicant may have been in debt or under some pressure—there was no clear exploitative relationship linking the offences to trafficking. The applicant’s voluntary and leading involvement in the crimes was established. Even if the applicant qualified as a victim of trafficking or modern slavery, which could warrant some mitigation, the seriousness of the offences and the public interest justified prosecution.

This case highlights that in immigration matters involving criminal charges, especially serious crimes such as drug offences, claims of being a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery require strong, consistent evidence to influence both criminal liability and immigration outcomes. UK courts apply a high standard for such claims, and personal statements alone rarely succeed. Simple or late claims that conflict with the facts are usually rejected and can weaken the defence. Therefore, it is crucial that such claims should be supported by solid evidence.

For applicants with criminal records or facing serious charges, even if there are vulnerable circumstances such as being forced to commit crimes, prosecution may continue based on public interest. Such criminal records can seriously affect future immigration applications.

Applicants with these kinds of experiences shall seek professional legal advice early, which helps assess whether there are grounds to claim trafficking or Modern Slavery and allows for timely use of protection mechanisms, such as the NRM, to collect supporting evidence.

If you or your family members face similar complex situations, please contact Lisa Law today. Our professional team is ready to provide thorough assessments and strong support.

 

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call us on 020 7928 0276, phone calls are operating as usual and we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

For more updates, follow us on our social media platforms! You can find them all on our Linktree right here.

author avatar
James Cook

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