When a family member steps in to care for an ageing parent, it is usually an act of love, not a business arrangement. Yet in Rogers v Wills, the High Court ruled that long-term family care can, in certain circumstances, create a binding legal obligation to pay. Such a situation can arise even without a formal contract, as an estate may still owe compensation for the benefit received.

What happened

Bernadette Rogers, a retired nurse, took her 90-year-old mother, Sheila, into her home in Bristol after Sheila was found wandering on a road in Norfolk in a confused state. What began as a temporary stay became a long-term care arrangement lasting over two years. During this time, Sheila’s health declined significantly, and she required daily and often intimate care.

After Sheila’s death in 2020, her will divided the estate equally between her children and appointed her son, Andrew Wills, as executor.

Family members had repeatedly said that Bernadette should not be “out of pocket” for the care she was providing, and Sheila herself had insisted that she wished to “pay her way” and that her daughter should be “paid properly”.

Disputes later emerged within the family. Bernadette said that her mother and other relatives had agreed she would be paid a reasonable sum for her care. Andrew disagreed, insisting that the arrangement was purely domestic and not legally binding. Tensions deepened when Bernadette withdrew £100,000 from her mother’s bank account, claiming she had been authorised to do so.

A complete breakdown in the relationship between the siblings followed. Bernadette brought proceedings against her brother as executor, arguing that there was a contract for reasonable payment, or alternatively that the estate had been unjustly enriched by her unpaid work.

The court’s decision

The High Court found in Bernadette’s favour.

• The judge held that there was sufficient evidence from family discussions and Sheila’s own comments to show that the care was not intended to be gratuitous. This gave rise to an implied contract for services, entitling Bernadette to reasonable remuneration under the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.
• The court rejected arguments that Sheila lacked capacity to make such an agreement. HHJ Paul Matthews emphasised that a diagnosis of dementia does not automatically remove capacity, which must be assessed for each decision and proved to be absent with evidence. The court reaffirmed the presumption of capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and found that Sheila remained capable of making binding arrangements.
• Even if no contract existed, the estate had still benefited from Bernadette’s services. The court held that Sheila had freely accepted her daughter’s care, knowing it was not intended to be a gift.

In doing so, the court drew a clear distinction between two restitutionary principles: failure of basis, which depends on a shared mistaken assumption, and free acceptance, which arises where someone knowingly accepts a benefit without paying for it. The latter applied here, since Sheila had knowingly accepted care with the understanding that payment would follow.

Although the exact amount of compensation was left for a later hearing, the court encouraged the parties to resolve the matter through mediation rather than further litigation.

The follow-up costs ruling

A month later, in Rogers v Wills [2025] EWHC 1711 (Ch), the court ordered Andrew Wills to pay Bernadette’s legal costs of the liability trial. The judge noted that she was clearly the successful party and awarded an interim payment of £75,685.50, representing 90% of her approved costs budget.

The judgment also reminded executors that they are personally responsible for litigation costs unless they have obtained a Beddoe order – a formal court permission to use estate funds to defend or pursue proceedings.

Why this case matters

This decision outlines the legal obligations for family care and is a thoughtful reminder that goodwill and care within families can, over time, blur into legal and financial responsibility.

The case also illustrates how the courts will increasingly look at family care arrangements through the same lens as professional ones, especially where long-term support replaces formal care services. It highlights the importance of documenting intentions at an early stage to avoid costly disputes after death.

Practical lessons for families and advisers:

• Record any understanding about payment for family care in writing, even if it feels awkward.
• Consider a short written care or service agreement to avoid uncertainty later.
• Executors should seek legal advice early, particularly before spending estate funds on legal costs.
• Mediation can often achieve a fair resolution without the strain of further proceedings.

As more families take on caring roles, Rogers v Wills underlines the importance of clarity. Compassion and trust remain at the heart of family life, but they are best supported by clear agreements and early professional advice. In the end, a short conversation and a written understanding can prevent years of uncertainty and conflict.

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James Cook

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A landmark change in the law will see family courts working from a starting point of no longer presuming that having contact with both parents is in the best interests of a child, commonly known as presumption of parental involvement.

Presently, under Section 8 of the Children Act 1989, courts in England and Wales work under the principle that children should have contact with both parents providing that there is no evidence that a parent could put the child at risk of harm.

According to family lawyers and campaigners, this “pro-contact culture” has meant that in many cases, the family courts have placed the rights of abusive fathers over the safety and wellbeing of children.

This has often put children at risk, with a report published last month for the domestic abuse commissioner’s office finding that even in cases where domestic abuse was present, unsupervised overnight contact had been allowed. A review of the presumption of parental involvement was originally launched in November 2020 by the then Conversative government, which concluded in 2024, however the results were not published by the Ministry of Justice until now.

While the change isn’t immediate, the government has confirmed that it would repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989 “when parliamentary time allows”. Campaigners have called for the immediate repeal of the presumption of parental involvement following the decision.

The government also recently announced plans to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility in cases where a personal with parental responsibility has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against any child, or in cases where a child has been born of rape. These measures form part of their plan to halve violence against women and girls in a decade.

What did “parental involvement” look like under the previous law?

The presumption of parental involvement applies to any kind of parental involvement. This can be direct (such as face-to-face contact) or indirect (such as letters, messages, or phone calls) – provided it is consistent with the child’s welfare.

This principle was introduced through the Children and Families Act 2014, following concerns that some parents, particularly fathers, were being unfairly excluded from their children’s lives after separation. The reform was intended to reinforce the importance of both parents maintaining a meaningful role in their child’s upbringing.

The approach has since proved controversial and is now at the centre of debate, with critics arguing that it has, in practice, led to unsafe contact arrangements in cases involving domestic abuse.

The Chief Executive of the charity, Women’s Aid, Farah Nazeer, commented on the decision:

“Women’s Aid warmly welcomes the decision to remove the presumption of contact in family court cases. This archaic presumption has put the lives of women and children at risk for far too long, and this must stop now.

Contact with an abuser is deeply harmful to children, with it not only risking their physical and mental wellbeing, behaviour, and development, but also their lives, in the most extreme of cases.

Decision makers need to recognise that abuse is a pattern of behaviours, and that the potential for escalation and risk of harm is there even after the parent’s relationship has ended.”

Family Solicitor Explains

Family Law Solicitor, Xinlei Zhang, explains the legal implications of the decision and its impact on clients.

While the intention behind the presumption of both parents’ involvement in a child’s life is to promote parental relationships – so that the child can grow up knowing both parents and maintaining relationships with each after separation – it was originally believed to be in the child’s best interests. However, this approach often overlooked the fact that the child’s safety must remain the paramount consideration, particularly in cases involving domestic abuse, where the courts have at times still permitted contact despite risks.

Following recent changes, the courts must now carefully assess any allegations of harm towards the child and weigh the presumption of parental involvement alongside the other factors in the welfare checklist under section 1 of the Children Act 1989. This approach provides a more balanced and effective way to safeguard children’s welfare.

Allegations of harm, including any past abusive behaviour, are now taken very seriously by the courts. Judges will carefully consider whether contact or shared parenting is safe. Parents can take comfort in knowing that the law aims to protect children while still allowing them to maintain safe and meaningful relationships with both parents wherever possible.

Have questions? Get in touch today!

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James Cook

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For separated parents with international ties, planning a family holiday can quickly turn into a legal battleground. While trips to see relatives or explore a child’s cultural heritage may seem innocent, if the destination lies outside the Hague Convention on child abduction, the courts treat them with extreme caution. This was demonstrated in two recent family-court cases, WO v RO [2017] and F v M [2025], which highlight how judges assess the real risks of non-return from non-Hague countries and the limits of international legal protection.

The legal test

Both judgments draw from Re R (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1115. When a parent seeks to take a child to a non-Hague Convention country, the court must weigh three connected elements:

1. Risk of breach: the likelihood that the child will not be returned.
2. Consequences of breach: the impact if non-return occurs.
3. Effectiveness of safeguards: whether practical, enforceable protections exist.

These factors sit under the overriding duty in section 1 of the Children Act 1989: the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration, and every case turns on its own facts. The court must be positively satisfied that the advantages of travel outweigh the risks. If in doubt, it must err on the side of caution and refuse permission.

WO v RO [2017]: a moderate risk was still too much

Mr Justice Baker was asked to decide whether a mother could take her two sons, aged eight and six, to China for a 21-day visit each year. The family had a history of conflict, allegations of domestic abuse, and involvement by social services. The boys lived with their mother but saw their father regularly.

The parents’ positions

Mother: a Chinese national who had obtained British citizenship. She wished to take the children to visit their maternal grandfather in China. The mother also offered to travel on her British passport, to renounce her Chinese nationality, and her father even offered £10,000 as security. She said her life was now in England.

Father: aged 74, a dual UK-Australian national. He opposed the trip, pointing to her limited financial stability, insecure housing, and continuing links to China, including a property in Sanya. He argued there was a real risk of non-return.

Expert and guardian evidence

An expert in Chinese law confirmed that China is not a signatory to the Hague Convention and has no bilateral arrangements with the UK. English child-arrangement orders are not recognised or enforceable in China. If the children were retained, the father would have to start fresh proceedings under Chinese law, with no guarantee of success.

The children’s guardian recognised the cultural value of a visit but described the risk of non-return as “finely balanced” and advised that travel should not yet take place.

The outcome

Mr Justice Baker refused permission. He found:

• a “moderate, not insignificant” risk that the mother might not return the children;
• proposed safeguards, including renouncing nationality and the £10,000 bond, were inadequate; and
• the consequences of non-return would be devastating: loss of relationship with their father, removal from their home and school, and isolation in a country whose language they did not speak.

Although the court accepted the cultural benefits of visiting China, these could not outweigh the risks. The application was refused.

F v M (2025): court confirms a very high risk

Eight years later, F v M came before His Honour Judge Marin in the Central London Family Court. The echoes of the previous case, WO v RO, were unmistakable.

The background

The case concerned two boys, aged ten and eight. Their mother, born in China, had lived in England for over twenty years and renounced her Chinese citizenship. The father was from Northern Ireland. After a difficult separation and prior litigation over contact and school fees, the children lived with the mother but saw the father regularly until 2023, when she stopped contact following an allegation he had hit them. A local-authority assessment found no safeguarding concerns.

The father applied for a child-arrangements order to restore contact. During proceedings, the mother applied first to relocate to Thailand for two years, then, after withdrawing that plan, sought permission to take the children to China for a five-week summer holiday, citing her parents’ ill-health as the reason for travel.

Expert evidence

As in WO v RO, an expert in Chinese family law was instructed. He confirmed that:

• neither Hague nor bilateral enforcement mechanisms exist;
• English orders cannot be “mirrored” or enforced in China;
• if a parent remained there with the children for a year, the Chinese courts could assume jurisdiction based on habitual residence; and
• any new proceedings would be heard de novo, applying Chinese law, with uncertain outcomes.

He warned that enforcement in China remained “sluggish”, and even agreed safeguards could not guarantee a return.

Welfare evidence

Two independent social-work reports were before the court. The 2025 report concluded that the children had been exposed to adult conflict, were aligned with the mother, and that there was a flight risk given her past behaviour, including an earlier unsanctioned trip taking the children from China to Thailand.

The court’s findings

Judge Marin found the mother’s evidence dishonest and unreliable, noting repeated breaches of court orders and her unauthorised travel to Thailand despite a previous agreement limiting the trip to China. He found that she “felt she could do as she liked” and showed “no regard for court orders or the authority of the court.”

Applying the same Re R test and explicitly citing WO v RO, the court held:

• Risk of breach: very high. The judge said he had “no faith that she would respect any order made by this court.”
• Consequences: equally grave. China’s lack of Hague participation meant that if she kept the children there, recovery proceedings would be slow, expensive, and uncertain. Expert evidence suggested the father’s chance of success was “small.”
• Safeguards: worthless in practice. The mother’s offer to place an £800,000 London flat in escrow was rejected; she could sell or remortgage it, and Chinese courts might still not enforce a return.

The court accepted that visiting elderly grandparents and exploring cultural roots were genuine benefits, but held that these were outweighed “by far” by the risk of non-return. Permission to travel was refused, and the prohibited-steps order remained in place.

Outcome – continuity of principle

Both decisions confirm the same principle: the court will not permit travel unless the risk of non-return is truly minimal.

In WO v RO, a moderate risk with no enforceable safeguards was enough to bar travel. In F v M, where the parent had breached orders and acted dishonestly, that risk was classed as very high.

The outcome was the same, but the court’s language was firmer: even substantial financial or property-based bonds could not overcome the absence of enforceable legal remedies abroad.

Both judges emphasised that cultural and familial benefits, however sincere, cannot outweigh a serious or unmitigated risk to a child’s stability and relationships.

Lessons for families

1. Non-Hague destinations carry exceptional scrutiny

Without the Hague Convention’s return mechanisms, English orders have little or no effect overseas. Courts will examine every connection – financial, residential, and personal – before granting permission.

2. Safeguards must be real, not symbolic

Bonds, passport undertakings or property pledges mean little if the foreign jurisdiction will not enforce them. Courts look for practical, reliable mechanisms – often impossible in non-Hague countries.

3. Credibility decides outcomes

Both cases turned on whether the court trusted the parent seeking permission. Inconsistencies, incomplete disclosure or past breaches of orders weigh heavily against any application.

4. Welfare remains paramount

Even genuine cultural and familial benefits abroad will not outweigh risks of non-return, loss of contact, or emotional harm to the children.

Final thoughts

From WO v RO, to F v M, the message is consistent and clear. International travel can enrich a child’s life, but where the destination lies outside the Hague framework, the courts proceed with extreme caution. Unless the risk of non-return is truly minimal and the safeguards genuinely enforceable, permission is unlikely to be granted.

For parents and practitioners alike, these cases underline one truth: what may seem like a short family holiday can, in legal terms, be judged simply too risky to allow.

Have questions? Get in touch today!

Call our office on 020 7928 0276, we will be taking calls from 9:30am to 6:00pm.

Email us on info@lisaslaw.co.uk.

Or, use the contact form on our website. Simply enter your details and leave a message, we will get right back to you: https://lisaslaw.co.uk/contact/

For more updates, follow us on our social media platforms! You can find them all on our Linktree right here.

James Cook

See Full Bio